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THE SOCIAL COST OF INERTIA:
HOW COST-BENEFIT INCOHERENCE
THREATENS TO DERAIL U.S. CLIMATE ACTION
MELISSA J. LUTTRELL†
ABSTRACT
As EPA rolls out controversial regulations on power plant
emissions of greenhouse gases, a vocal group of legislators, industry
groups, and legal and economic scholars are crying foul, arguing EPA
didn’t “follow the rules” when it conducted its cost-benefit analyses of
these regulations.
This article traces the origin of these cost-benefit rules, finding that
the methodological handbook alleged to be the “worldwide gold
standard” was actually developed through a fundamentally flawed
process, one that intentionally excluded majority viewpoints in several
relevant academic disciplines. Unsurprisingly, it also contains serious
methodological mistakes. If these mistakes were to be applied to
regulations addressing domestic greenhouse gas emissions (that is, if
EPA and other executive agencies do “follow the rules,” as demanded
by the critics of these regulations in Congress, academia and regulated
industry), this injection of both outright irrationality and arguably
unethical subjective biases into domestic regulatory policy would
threaten to derail substantive U.S. action on climate change.
This article also describes how the executive order that spawned
these rules is impossible to comply with literally, because it creates a
series of “max/min” problems with no common solution. This creates
a conundrum that, over and over again, is resolved under these costbenefit rules in favor of maximizing quantifiable, monetized “net
benefits,” at the expense of promoting a set of competing yet also
important rights- and duty-based factors that the text of the parent
executive order ostensibly puts on equal footing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. General Background on the Human Impacts of the Cost-Benefit
Analysis Approach to Climate Change Regulation
When a powerful storm destroyed her riverside home in 2009,
Jahanara Khatun lost more than the modest roof over her head. In
the aftermath, her husband died and she became so destitute that
she sold her son and daughter into bonded servitude . . .
She spends her days collecting cow dung for fuel and struggling to
grow vegetables in soil poisoned by salt water. Climate scientists
predict that this area will be inundated as sea levels rise and storm
surges increase . . . . But Ms. Khatun is trying to hold out at least
for a while—one of millions living on borrowed time in this vast
landscape of river islands, bamboo huts, heartbreaking choices and
impossible hopes.1

Human-caused climate change causes tens of thousands of deaths
worldwide each year. This death rate, along with rates of other
2
human health impacts, is virtually certain to increase over time. The
United States—though recently dethroned by China as the world’s
largest carbon dioxide emitter—remains among the largest carbon
3
dioxide emitters per capita. Because carbon dioxide pollution can

1. Gardiner Harris, As Seas Rise, Millions Cling to Borrowed Time and Dying Land, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2014, at A1.
2. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HEALTH: FACT SHEET NO.
266 (2013), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs266/en/ (projecting 250,000
additional deaths each year from 2030 to 2050); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS: CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION,
AND VULNERABILITY, 11–14, available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_
SPM_FINAL.pdf (anticipating species extinction, increased food scarcity, and reduction in
water resources).
3. Freya Roberts, 2012’s Carbon Emissions in Five Graphs, THE CARBON BRIEF (Nov. 1,
2013, 2:10 PM), http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2013/11/2012s-carbon-emissions-in-five-graphs/
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4

persist in the environment for hundreds or even thousands of years,
the United States remains responsible for the largest share of
increased carbon dioxide currently in the world’s air, oceans, and
5
soil.
The executive branch is attempting to address climate change by
pressing a controversial domestic agenda and putting the U.S. on
track to take a leadership role at the crucial international negotiations
scheduled for Paris in 2015. The Obama administration’s relevant
proposed and finalized regulations include conservation regulations,
6
fuel economy standards, and limits on pollution from power plants.
The administration has also championed subsidies for solar and wind
7
energy, among other non-regulatory energy policy measures.
Stories like that of Ms. Khatun, above, make patent the
destruction imposed by the United States and other large-scale
emitters onto poor countries that are ill-equipped to cope with these
8
harms; these human scale accounts tend to create an impetus to act.

(“In the US, emissions per capita were 16.4 tonnes, and just behind came oil-rich Saudi Arabia
with per capita emissions of 16.2 tonnes. The EU and China—both major emitters in absolute
terms—had much smaller per capita emissions, at 7.4 and 7.1 tonnes respectively.”); Louise
Watt, US, China Take Small Steps Toward Fighting Climate Change, but Differ on Global Plan,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 9, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/business/
articles/2014/07/09/ china-us-differ-on-global-plan-to-cut-emissions.
4. Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a
Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 50 (2009).
5. James Hansen et al., Dangerous Human-Made Interference with Climate: A GISS
ModelE Study, 7 ATMOS. CHEM. PHYS. 2287, 2303 (2007).
6. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 6,
8, 11 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27
sclimateactionplan.pdf.
7. Id. at 19–20; see also Tony Barboza, Obama-Appointed Climate Change Task Force
Meets in Los Angeles, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/
la-sci-sn-climate-change-task-force-obama-brown-garcetti—20140213-story.html#axzz2tGQ
jJkKT (recounting Obama administration officials’ discussions on improving disaster response,
use of federal transportation funding, electrical grid upgrades, and renewable energy financing);
Coral Davenport, White House Announces 7 Regional Climate Hubs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2014),
at A13 (detailing the administration’s creation of “climate hubs” to assist rural communities in
responding to the risks of climate change).
8. See CASS SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 152 (2013) [hereinafter
SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER] (explaining that, “[i]f something bad happens and is memorable,” its
occurrence may motivate citizens to move for “aggressive regulation” in response); see also
ALEX RANDALL, JO SALSBURY, & ZACH WHITE, CLIMATE OUTREACH & INFO. NETWORK,
MOVING STORIES: THE VOICES OF PEOPLE WHO MOVE IN THE CONTEXT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (2014), available at http://climatemigration.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/MovingStories.pdf (collecting first-person accounts of the effect of
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But framing the narrative as one of aggregate risk serves to suppress
this instinct, and further reducing estimates of aggregate risks to mere
inputs into a larger cost-benefit analysis (CBA) moves the narrative
even further away from the human instinct to protect vulnerable
people in well-publicized danger and closer to what some argue is a
9
better, more rational position from which to make policy decisions.
For example, in his remarks from the Senate floor criticizing an
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposal to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), like carbon dioxide, from
existing power plants, Senator John Cornyn said:
I wish to clarify once again that the debate over President Obama’s
EPA rule is not about the science of climate change; it is a debate
about whether massive regulations should be forced to pass a
simple cost-benefit analysis. The EPA rule clearly fails that test.10

While EPA and other agencies have developed regulations on
GHGs, and President Obama has pressed other elements of his
“Climate Action Plan,” many Members of Congress have taken a
tack similar to that of Senator Cornyn. They explain that they oppose
proposals to reduce GHG emissions, not necessarily because they
deny the underlying science or lack concern for people who will be
harmed by climate change, but—at least in part—because they are
persuaded that CBA shows the proposals will do more harm than
11
good.

environmental change).
9. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 753 (1999) (explaining how cost-benefit analysis can “serve as a check on illadvised availability campaigns”); but see Cass Sunstein, People Don’t Fear Climate Change
Enough, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Aug. 27, 2013, 9:11 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/
2013-08-27/people-don-t-fear-climate-change-enough (explaining that, because climate change
is not necessarily directly linked to isolated and memorable disasters, people are not as driven to
“outrage” as by other, more distinct risks or hazards).
10. 160 CONG. REC. S3354, S3355–56 (2014) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn).
11. See, e.g., 160 CONG. REC. H1649, H1654 (2014) (statement of Rep. Bob Latta) (“[T]he
EPA has put forward broad-reaching regulatory proposals that are either unachievable or lack
sufficient cost-benefit justifications. One of the most harmful proposals includes the greenhouse
gas emission standards for new power plants that aim to stop the use of coal as an energy
source.”); Id. at H1650 (statement of Rep. Vicky Hartzler) (“Congressional intent in the Clean
Air Act is clear. The EPA is required to complete a cost-benefit analysis and base their
regulations on the best commercially available technology. It is clear that these standards have
not been met.”); see also 160 CONG. REC. H6049, H6053 (2014) (statement of Rep. James
Lankford) (arguing for abandoning the use of a social cost model for carbon emissions, which
was created behind closed-doors, without public input); 160 CONG. REC. S3900, S3900–01
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There exists an enormous body of scholarship on CBA. To the
extent a portion of it, by accident or by design, is currently helping to
prop up such arguments against climate action, this scholarship’s
merits are of deadly serious concern because of what is at stake.
According to the latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), if current emissions trends continue, a
temperature increase of 4.1° to 4.8° C (about 7.4° to 8.6° F) by 2100 is
13
likely.
Under one plausible reductions scenario, where rates of
global carbon dioxide-equivalent emissions are reduced to stay 11%
to 17% below 2010 rates through 2050, and then drop to 21% to 54%
below 2010 rates from 2050 through 2100, a rise in average mean
14
temperature of 2.6° to 2.9° C (about 4.7° to 5.2° F) is still predicted.
Even under the latter scenario, IPCC scientists are confident that
climate change impacts will include increasing deaths and diseases
from devastating heat waves, droughts, floods, wildfires, disrupted
food production and water supply, damaged infrastructure, and
15
destroyed human settlements. At issue is real, human devastation
16
on an utterly massive scale. Unfortunately, however, climate change
is a policy problem that is particularly incompatible with the United
States’ current emphasis on CBA in regulatory policy.
The economic foundations of the type of regulatory CBA
practiced in the U.S. technically require that it be used only when the
projects under evaluation will not have a large impact on the
economy. Although the United States has been side-stepping this
fundamental principle for years, evaluating major climate regulations
(2014) (statement of Sen. Jeff Flake) (condemning the EPA’s current approach as “arbitrary,
cumbersome,” and “a violation of common sense”).
12. Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (and Some
Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1135, 1179 (2008) (detailing an increase in
CBA scholarship).
13. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 9–13, available at
http://report.mitigation2014.org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers_approved.pdf
(last visited Dec. 26, 2014).
14. Id. at 12.
15. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 7, available at
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf (last visited Dec.
26, 2014) (projecting that climate change problems are “virtually certain” to increase).
16. See id. (finding, inter alia, that “[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, and
since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia.
The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea
level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased.”).
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using current, standardized regulatory CBA methodologies violates
this principle in a more dramatic fashion than ever in our history.
To explain: CBA is a branch of applied microeconomics that—in
an effort to enhance welfare, utility, or some similar social objective—
applies some of the same economic assumptions applicable to a firm
or household more broadly. However, nothing could be larger, more
macro, than the global climate. Using microeconomic insights to
inform more “macro” regulatory decisions may be attractive when a
regulatory alternative (as with a proposal relating to a single firm that
has little influence on the larger economy) will have little impact on
any factors external to the microeconomic analysis. But the further
the actual facts move from this assumption, the less helpful such
microeconomic models become to real-world decision makers.
CBAs, because they rely on estimates of “partial equilibrium
analyses,” assume any factors not under assessment will remain
unaffected while the set of moving pieces actually under analysis are
17
evaluated. However, performing valid partial equilibrium analyses
(or even making defensible estimates) is not even theoretically
possible when the condition of the entire, populated planet centuries
18
into the future is one of the moving pieces. National energy and
climate policy seem particularly unsuited for a sort of accounting that
depends on a number of external factors to remain the same, no
matter what action is or isn’t taken. Unfortunately, despite this
fundamental incompatibility, CBA is playing a key role in the current
debate. Thus, it is necessary to examine the merits of the relevant
methodological arguments. For example, is it true that EPA’s
proposed rule for existing power plant emissions “fail” CBA, as many
19
Members of Congress have claimed? Or does EPA get it right when

17. See RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 45–47
(2004) (describing partial equilibrium analysis and explaining that a partial equilibrium analysis
approach is useful, but requires focusing on one factor at a time and assuming that all other
factors are unaffected).
18. C.f. Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1,
47 (2011) (“[I]magine the pursuit of social welfare maximization as being akin to climbing a
mountain. Partial equilibrium analysis offers narrow technical advice on how best to climb that
mountain . . . . Nowhere in the analysis, however, is the question posed, ‘Are we on the right
mountain?’”).
19. See supra note 11; see also Determining the Proper Scope of Climate Change Benefits,
BROOKINGS INST. (June 4, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/06/04determining-proper-scope-climate-change-benefits-gayer (“[A] new working paper from Ted
Gayer and Kip Viscusi suggests that the EPA’s methodology for calculating the benefit
represents a shift away from typical practice. A more traditional cost-benefit analysis would
estimate climate benefits of only $2 billion to $7 billion—less than the estimated compliance
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its CBA estimates that these regulations will result in billions of
20
dollars in net social welfare benefits? Given the number of value
21
judgments involved in producing these assessments, and given the
22
shaky foundation upon which this endeavor rests, there can be no
objectively correct answer to these questions. What can be shown,
though, and what this article establishes, is that CBA provides no
rational justification for putting the brakes on climate change
regulations. To the extent these welfare analyses do tell us anything
useful, they counsel that we are waiting too long to do too little. To
put it back into human terms, the United States’ inertia—its
attachment to existing, flawed policy and to existing, irrational tactics
for regulatory analysis—is imperiling hundreds of millions of lives of
real people like Ms. Khatun.
B. How Mistakes in an Arcane CBA Methodological Handbook Fuel
Opposition to Climate Change Regulations
The foundation for some of these claims that climate change
proposals “fail” CBA—and the corollary claim that these proposals
would fail CBA if only agency economists would “follow the rules” of
CBA—can be found in an obscure 2003 handbook created by George
W. Bush’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB). These
guidelines, titled “OMB Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis,”
(colloquially, A-4) establish methodologies agencies must use in the
Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) they must prepare for major
23
rules subject to OMB-supervised regulatory review.
cost[.]”) (citing TED GAYER & W. KIP VISCUSI, DETERMINING THE PROPER SCOPE OF
CLIMATE CHANGE BENEFITS 3–4 (June 3, 2014), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/research/files/papers/2014/06/04%20determining%20proper%20scope%20climate%20ch
ange%20benefits%20gayer/04_determining_proper_scope_climate_change_benefits.pdf).
20. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt.
60).
21. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1596–99 (2011) (summarizing the various judgments required
for cost-benefit analysis and their potential for arbitrariness).
22. Douglas A. Kysar, Politics By Other Meanings: A Comment On “Retaking Rationality
Two Years Later,” 48 HOUS. L. REV. 43, 68 (2011) (“Invariably, cost-benefit analyses of
proposed regulations are dense, jargony, and opaque; inevitably they contain moments deep
within their technical details in which the analyst masks a critical value choice through a
methodological maneuver . . . . [And the foundational value questions] are typically treated by
cost-benefit proponents as matters of elite expertise or disciplinary orthodoxy, rather than
debatable moral and political issues.”).
23. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003)
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When EPA’s claims about the welfare impacts of a rule are
24
inconsistent with A-4, critics argue that EPA’s estimates are bogus.
For example, in response to a request from Senator David Vitter and
Representative Darrell Issa, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) released a report in July 2014 assessing “how EPA has
used economic analyses in its decision making during the rulemaking
process and the extent to which EPA adhered to OMB guidance in
conducting selected elements of the economic analyses the agency
25
used to support recent rulemakings.” To meet this objective, GAO
studied seven EPA rulemakings and “assessed them against key
principles outlined in OMB Circular A-4,” ultimately finding that
26
EPA did not always follow the guidelines contained in A-4.
Predictably, this finding that EPA did not comply fully with A-4 has
fueled claims that EPA’s proposed new climate change regulations
27
are themselves deeply flawed.
There has even been legislation introduced in the House that
would specifically require EPA to follow A-4 in new analyses of
[hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR A-4]; see also OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
AGENCY CHECKLIST: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
(2010),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/RIA_Checklist.pdf
[hereinafter RIA CHECKLIST]. Though some of these papers may not be published in academic
journals, they have proven powerful on Capitol Hill, undergirding the positions of opponents of
mandatory GHG reductions. See, e.g., The ‘Social Cost of Carbon:’ Some Surprising Facts:
Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of
Robert P. Murphy, Senior Economist, Institute for Energy Research); U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE: INST. FOR 21ST CENTURY ENERGY, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF POTENTIAL NEW
CARBON
REGULATIONS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
(2014),
available
at
http://www.energyxxi.org/sites/default/files/file-tool/Assessing_the_Impact_of_Potential_New_
Carbon_Regulations_in_the_United_States.pdf; Robert P. Murphy, Power Plant Rule Fails
Administration’s Own Cost/Benefit Test, INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (Jun. 2, 2014),
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/power-plant-rule-fails-administrations-costbenefittest/#.
24. Issa, Vitter: GAO Report Confirms EPA Fudges Costs of Regulations, COMM. ON
OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM (Aug. 11, 2014), http://oversight.house.gov/release/issa-vittergao-report-confirms-epa-fudges-costs-regulations/ [hereinafter Issa, Vitter] (Representative Issa
contends that the “Obama Administration failed to provide thorough, transparent cost-benefit
analyses for major environmental rules that cost American jobs” and that “EPA pushed
through regulations using sloppy analysis[.]” Senator Vitter claims the GAO report
demonstrated problems with “EPA’s methodologies for claiming health and employment
impacts, both of which they are fudging[.]”).
25. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-14-519, ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: EPA SHOULD IMPROVE ADHERENCE TO GUIDANCE FOR SELECTED
ELEMENTS OF REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES 3 (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/
assets/670/664872.pdf.
26. Id. at 3–4, 10.
27. Issa, Vitter, supra note 24; see also S. Res. 512, 113th Cong. (2014) (devoting four pages
to complaints over the EPA’s proposed rules for carbon pollution emission guidelines).
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EPA’s Clean Power Plan. The Clean Power Plan sets GHG
28
emissions limits for new and existing power plants.
The cachet of A-4 is bolstered by continued favorable treatment
by many in the legal academy, including such prominent CBA
29
30
scholars as Professors Cass Sunstein and Kip Viscusi (who also
31
happen to have been among the seven peer reviewers of A-4).
While this scholarly work may not support climate inaction directly—
Cass Sunstein was personally involved in approving some of the GHG
32
regulations and policies at issue in the current debate —academic
support for applying flawed A-4 directives to regulations, including
GHG regulations, is lending credibility to overtly political anti33
regulatory rhetoric that relies on A-4.
Much of the current confusion over the appropriate way to
conduct a regulatory CBA derives from the executive order that
spawned A-4, an executive order that is impossible to comply with
literally (see discussion in Part IV, below). This still-operative
Clinton-era order, Executive Order 12,866, “Regulatory Planning and
Review,” requires executive agencies to prepare regulatory impact
analyses (RIAs) for a centralized review overseen by OMB’s Office
34
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). When George W.
Bush’s OMB initially issued Circular A-4 in 2003, this represented a
move away from considering deontological values in RIAs (explicitly
required under President Clinton’s executive order), and a shift
toward giving heavier weight to formalistic CBA results.
The stated purpose of A-4 is to implement the language in E.O.
35
12,866 that calls for assessing projected costs and benefits. But E.O.
12,866 also requires evaluating and optimizing numerous other
considerations, some of which are incompatible with even this “soft”

28. H.R. 2948, 113th Cong. (2013).
29. Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions (and
Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 172–73 (2014) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Thirty-Six Questions].
30. GAYER & VISCUSI, supra note 19, at 13.
31. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 1.
32. Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29, at 171.
33. E.g., 160 CONG. REC. H1649, H1650 (2014) (statement of Rep. Vicky Hartzler); Issa,
Vitter, supra note 24.
34. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). A closely related
Executive Order issued by President Obama “is supplemental to and reaffirms” E.O. 12,866’s
regulatory analysis provisions. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
35. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 1.
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CBA decision criterion. The Order sets out a series of irreconcilable
“max/min” problems with no common solution, a series of directives
to do the impossible, i.e., to identify the single solution that
maximizes or minimizes multiple competing variables all at once. For
analysts producing RIAs under A-4, it creates a conundrum that, over
and over again, is resolved in favor of maximizing quantifiable,
monetized “net benefits” (to the extent this is consistent with the
agency’s mandate), at the expense of promoting other conflicting yet
also important duty- and rights-based factors that the text of the
executive order puts on equal footing with the consequentialist
concerns addressed by CBA.
This problem was exacerbated when, in one of his first major
moves after becoming OIRA Administrator in 2009, Professor Cass
Sunstein issued a memorandum to agencies calling for even more
rigid adherence to A-4 than was required under the George W. Bush
36
administration that created it. The increasing ascendancy of A-4
results in E.O. 12,866-implementation in a way that gives insufficient
influence to the ethical, deontological concerns expressly recognized
as deserving protection by the language of that executive order.
Furthermore, A-4 is deeply flawed even when considered only as
a tool for achieving its consequentialist objective to identify
regulatory options that maximize net social welfare. It instructs
agencies to use a set of estimation procedures that, on the whole, are
biased against protective regulations, especially regulations whose
37
benefits accrue in the future and which are harder to quantify. For
example, A-4 requires that regulatory benefits that will accrue in the
future must be reported using a very high discount rate, one that
commentators almost universally describe as too high even while
OMB specifies more correct, lower rates to be used in other types of
38
analyses. One might ask why OMB would not just allow but actually
36. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A
PRIMER (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/
circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf
(reiterating and expounding the
requirements which Circular A-4 places upon agencies).
37. David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 400
(2006) (CBA “has thwarted environmental protection completely”) [hereinafter Driesen, Is
Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?]; Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of
Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2042 (2002) (CBA cost
estimates are consistently too high because they are made by regulated entities).
38. See Melissa J. Luttrell, The Case for Differential Discounting: How a Small Rate Change
Could Help Agencies Save More Lives and Make More Sense, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 80,
115 [hereinafter Luttrell, Differential Discounting] (discussing OMB’s explanation for applying
different discount rates for different kinds of benefits); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
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mandate CBA methodologies that are fringe positions in the field of
mainstream welfare economics (excluding the un-peer reviewed, selfpublished work produced by regulatory think tanks, much of it
funded in some way by regulated industry itself)? The answer may lie
in the fact that many of the erroneous and subjectively biased
methodologies now enshrined in A-4 date back to the Reagan era,
when the preferred methodologies of overtly anti-regulatory interests
were promoted by OMB and imposed to varying degrees on agencies
39
for the express purpose of slowing them down.
Unfortunately, despite all A-4’s defects and limitations, over
time it has come to be regarded by many as the “worldwide gold
40
standard” of applied regulatory analysis.
Supporters of robust
agency CBA requirements, including former OIRA administrators
under Republican and Democratic administrations, endorse A-4 as
being produced under rigorous peer review and a public comment
41
process. They also claim it reflects the mainstream consensus among
42
relevant experts.
However, the process by which A-4 was prepared did not include
“notice and comment” in the sense that phrase is traditionally used
for rulemakings under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). A
crucial difference is that in APA rulemakings the rulemaking agency
must provide a reasonable, non-arbitrary response to commenters or
face possible legal consequences for moving forward in the face of
43
commenter criticism. Here, no such requirement was imposed.

CIRCULAR NO. A-94, 8–9 (1992), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094#8;
see infra notes 108–119 and accompanying text.
39. See Heritage Foundation Report: Reagan Team’s Blueprint to EPA, 53 WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL FED’N 16, 16–17 (1981) (promoting “full decentralization” of decisionmaking processes); see also Luttrell, Differential Discounting, supra note 38, at 81−82; JAMES
MILLER, FIX THE U.S. BUDGET!: URGINGS OF AN “ABOMINABLE NO-MAN” 2 (1994); Thomas
O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 58 (1998) [hereinafter McGarity, A
Cost-Benefit State]; Lawrence Mosher, Reaganites, with OMB’s List in Hand, Take Dead Aim at
EPA’s Regulations, 13 NAT’L 256, 256 (1981) (James C. Miller III, head of the OMB office that
compiled an analysis of environmental regulations by EPA stated “[w]e’re going to be putting
down very hard rules for them.”).
40. Videotape: Administrative Conference of the United States: Committee on Regulation
(Apr. 29, 2013 at 1:40:33), http://acus.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=82
(statement of Susan Dudley).
41. Id. at 1:40:23; John D. Graham, Valuing the Future: OMB’s Refined Position, 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 51, 51 (2007); see Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29, at 201 (considering A-4
“binding, because it reflects the official position of the U.S. government”).
42. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 21.
43. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS 9 (Apr. 2011), available at
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Similarly, its proponents claim A-4 is reliable because it is “peer
reviewed,” but the process used was grossly inadequate. Though the
peer reviewers were well-regarded scholars, they represented a very
narrow set of viewpoints, and many of them had real or apparent
44
conflicts of interest. Furthermore, there was never a requirement
45
that Circular A-4 actually had to satisfy these peer reviewers.
As the Obama administration implements its “Climate Action
Plan,” it will rely on A-4 methodologies to complete CBAs of major
climate regulations. To incorporate the monetized value of climate
benefits and costs into these CBAs, agencies will rely on the
administration’s controversial Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) estimates.
The oft-repeated criticism that the SCC is too high because it
arguably was derived in a way inconsistent with two A-4
methodological guidelines (ones that would have reduced the SCC by
reducing the weight given to future beneficiaries and to people
outside the United States) is flawed in substance since these are
legitimate concerns for regulatory analyses. This critique is also
procedurally flawed to the extent it assumes any executive agency
obligation to comply with this flawed set of OMB guidelines that
were never officially promulgated as a rule or enacted as a law.
Moreover, had the SCC been derived using certain other, more
reasonable OMB methodologies that were not followed—such as the
requests to use appropriate values for human lives and to use a logical
baseline—the SCC estimates would have been even higher.
Part II of this article describes regulatory analysis, including the
enhanced role of A-4, under the Obama administration. Part III
explains why E.O. 12,866 is incoherent; I argue, however, that even
given the impossibility of literally implementing all of E.O. 12,866’s
inconsistent directives, OIRA errs in emphasizing CBA to the extent
it does.
Part IV contends that A-4 contains substantive
methodological flaws that have a significant impact on regulations
and explains how A-4 was created through a flawed process. Part V
argues that the legal scholars, lobbyists, and government policy
makers (including some Members of Congress) who criticize the SCC
http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/Value%20of%20Travel%20Time.pdf;
see
also
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“[T]he agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of
the relevant material presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose.”).
44. See infra notes 126, 135 and accompanying text.
45. See infra p. 167.
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for considering the impacts of externalizing emissions onto other
countries and for its failure to use an after-inflation (real) discount
rate of 7%, err in claiming that these SCC numbers are illegitimate
for not “following the rules” as laid out in A-4. It also identifies
OMB guidelines not followed that would have increased the SCC.
Part VI concludes that A-4 is producing misleading results and that
compliance with A-4 should no longer be a required part of the
regulatory review process for any regulation, especially regulations
targeting climate change.
II. THE AMPLIFIED ROLE OF OMB METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES
ON REGULATORY ANALYSIS UNDER PRESIDENT OBAMA
Professor Sunstein, who is among the most cited and respected
legal scholars in the United States, served as President Obama’s first
“regulatory czar.” In that position he established an architecture of
regulatory review for this administration. While there are competing
narratives on the subject of how intrusive President Obama’s OIRA
has become in the rulemaking process, there is agreement on the
point that A-4 has become significantly more influential than it was
under the George W. Bush administration that created A-4.
Required adherence to formalistic methodological requirements has
significantly increased since President Clinton issued E.O. 12,866 in
1993.
OIRA has been criticized on multiple fronts since acquiring its
current role in the regulatory review apparatus in the 1980s. OIRA
has been likened to a regulatory black hole that often delays and
rejects proposed regulations before the public even has an
opportunity to review them. OIRA has also been attacked for
requiring agencies to engage in analyses that serve as a “one-way
ratchet,” systematically weakening public health and environmental
46
regulations.
OIRA-overseen regulatory review, if cynically used to enable a

46. David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 74 (2005); see Michael A. Livermore, Cause or Cure? Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Regulatory Gridlock, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 107, 109 (2008) (describing
longstanding concerns of environmentalists and “pro-regulatory groups” that cost-benefit
analysis was “code for deregulation”); see also Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, supra
note 37, at 347–48 (2006) (describing the EPA’s inability to regulate asbestos, despite clear
health concerns).
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president to avoid direct accountability for his or her unwillingness to
let an agency proceed, has few—if any—defenders on public policy
grounds. The legal legitimacy of this OIRA action does have
47
defenders. But OIRA qua rational regulatory reviewer, on the one
hand, and centralized inter-agency policy coordinator, on the other,
48
finds numerous champions in the literature.
When it is performing this more widely-accepted “regulatory
analysis” role, OIRA insists agencies follow the cost-benefit
49
methodologies enumerated in Circular A-4.
In describing the
regulatory review process, Professor Sunstein writes:
[T]he most difficult problems appear quite rarely, and when they
do, the executive branch usually has standardized methods for
handling them. These methods are often captured in authoritative
documents that are both meant and understood to bind executive
agencies even though they lack the force of law (in the sense that
they set out purely internal requirements and hence cannot be used
in court). The Office of Management and Budget’s Circular A-4,
issued in 2003, is the formal, binding guidance document that
governs the analysis of regulatory impacts, and it outlines many of
those standardized methods. (It is noteworthy that Circular A-4 was
issued in the George W. Bush Administration and continues in the
Obama Administration; its longevity attests to its technical
character.)50

But A-4 is not merely a “technical” document.
The
methodological prescriptions within it reflect decades of lobbying and
51
political wrangling. Choices that were controversial in 1981 may
appear more settled in 2014; this is because proponents of a certain
variety of cost-benefit analysis won a political battle, not because

47. See Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29, at 172–73 (explaining that A-4 is
binding, and that difficult problems only “rarely” arise, for which there are “standardized
methods”).
48. E.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2327–28
(2001).
49. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (requiring regulatory system
to account for costs and benefits, based on “the best available science”); see also RIA
CHECKLIST, supra note 23 (supporting the proposition that A-4 operationalizes E.O. 12,866 and
emphasizing importance of analyzing costs and benefits).
50. Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29, at 172–73 (emphasis added).
51. For examples of initially controversial anti-regulation biases benefitting regulated
industry that have persisted in OMB’s methodological guidelines since the Reagan
administration,see Luttrell, Differential Discounting, supra note 38, at 82 n.9.
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there has been a true meeting of the minds on strictly technical
52
matters after a robust debate in the relevant literatures. Entrenched
is not the same as correct.
In 2011, President Obama issued a new executive order on
regulatory review, E.O. 13,563, which explicitly re-affirms and does
53
not amend E.O. 12,866. The key rules at issue in the suite of rules
that will comprise the Obama administration’s climate regulations
will be “significant regulatory action[s]” (the trigger for mandatory
OIRA cost-benefit review under the Order) within the meaning of
54
E.O. 12,866. Interestingly, however, most rules reviewed by OIRA
today are not in any obvious way “significant regulatory action[s]”
55
that require OIRA review at all.
This appears to go against
President Clinton’s intention when he initially signed E.O. 12,866 and
explained that regulatory review would be “dramatically different”
56
and that many fewer regulations would be subjected to a review.
Since leaving his post as OIRA Administrator, Professor
Sunstein has produced a flurry of scholarship describing and
57
defending the OIRA-overseen regulatory review process.
The
52. Id. at 82, 127–28.
53. Its key addition was a directive to the agencies to conduct retrospective reviews of
regulation, a directive not at issue here. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,563, 78 Fed. Reg.
3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). To ensure compliance with the cost-benefit provisions of E.O. 13,563,
agencies are referred to A-4, the same manual that operationalizes CBA under Exec. Order No.
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51.735 (Jan. 21, 2012). RIA CHECKLIST, supra note 23.
54. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
55. See CURTIS COPELAND, LENGTH OF RULE REVIEWS BY THE OFFICE OF
INFORMATION
AND
REGULATORY
AFFAIRS
52
(2013),
available
at
http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/-Copeland%20Report%20CIRCULATED%
20to%20Committees%20on%2010-21-13.pdf (“some elements of the definition of a ‘significant
regulatory action’ are subject to interpretation, and OIRA may understandably view certain
rules as meeting the definition that agencies do not.”).
56. William J. Clinton, U.S. President, Remarks on Signing the Executive Order on
Regulatory Planning and Review and an Exchange With Reporters (Sept. 30, 1993), AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47134 (last visited Dec. 29,
2014).
57. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013) [hereinafter Sunstein, Myths and Realities]; SUNSTEIN,
SIMPLER supra note 8; Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29; Cass R. Sunstein, On Not
Revisiting Official Discount Rates: Institutional Inertia and the Social Cost of Carbon,
(Regulatory Policy Program, Working Paper No. RPP-2013-21, 2013) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Institutional Intertia]. In addition to the rules it is required to review, OIRA elects to review a
number of rules that are not categorized as “economically significant” under Executive Order
12,866. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra, at 1869; see also Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). OIRA review is a process all major executive agency proposed
rules must undergo at least twice before becoming regulations. Stuart Shapiro, Unequal
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window into the inner workings of OIRA that Professor Sunstein’s
recent writings provide is valuable to OIRA watchers both inside and
outside academia, because key portions of the review process are
closed to any external would-be monitors. For example, the crucial
first centralized regulatory review of an inchoate rule—including any
substantive revision to the proposed rule that occurs during this
process—generally happens before the public has any opportunity to
58
comment on (or even see) the agency’s original regulatory proposal.
And the public often has no idea whether a decision to hold up a rule
came from an OIRA desk officer or the White House Chief of Staff—
59
the process is that impenetrable.
While Professor Sunstein has been writing about OIRAoverseen centralized regulatory review and revision, additional
windows into how this process functions under the Obama
administration have appeared. The first was a critique by Professor
Lisa Heinzerling (former head of EPA’s Office of Policy and
Planning), who provides a first-hand account of a deeply
dysfunctional process, a narrative fundamentally at odds with
60
Professor Sunstein’s apologetics. More recently, Curtis Copeland
produced a report for the Administrative Conference of the United
States that offered numerous accounts from anonymous sources
inside the administration that—taken as a whole—also undermine
Professor Sunstein’s narrative of a lightly flawed but basically well61
functioning regulatory review apparatus.
Centralized review in the Obama administration prioritizes the
use of CBA in the regulatory decision-making process and has
created increased pressure on agencies to follow A-4 requirements
62
when assessing and reporting regulatory costs and benefits.
According to Professor Sunstein, the Obama administration’s focus
Partners: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Executive Review of Regulations, 35 ENVT’L. L. REP. 10433,
10435 (2005).
58. See COPELAND, supra note 55, at 15 (detailing the OIRA review process and
demonstrating that OIRA review of proposed rules occurs before publication).
59. See id. at 17 (describing the process by which disputes between agencies and the OMB
regarding the approval of a rule are resolved by the executive branch).
60. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the
Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
325 (2014) (discussing the relationship between the EPA and the White House, and the
“chaotic” and self-interested nature of OIRA’s review process).
61. See generally COPELAND, supra note 55, at 40–49.
62. Cass R. Sunstein, The Stunning Triumph of Cost-Benefit Analysis, BLOOMBERGVIEW
(Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-09-12/the-stunning-triumph-ofcost-benefit-analysis.
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on compliance with A-4 represents an “unprecedented commitment
63
to quantification of both costs and benefits.”
This increased emphasis on compliance with A-4 in rulemaking
and this policy focus on an especially rigid, formalistic CBA represent
a giant move away from the intentions of E.O. 12,866. Here, thenProfessor Elena Kagan describes the general intention of the Order:
[E.O. 12,866] suggested a generally more positive attitude toward
regulatory efforts, particularly on health and safety matters. In
addition to reciting language about the potential benefits of
regulation, the order eased the mandate that agencies use costbenefit analysis as the basis of decision-making by authorizing the
agencies to incorporate in this analysis “equity,” “distributive
impacts,” and “qualitative measures.”64

A comparison of regulatory analyses under the Clinton and
Obama administrations is illustrative of how far in the direction of
formal, quantitative cost-benefit analysis regulatory review under
E.O. 12,866 has drifted. For example, in its 2000 rulemaking on
health privacy standards, the Department of Health and Human
Services declined to place a monetary figure on the intangible value
of privacy, explaining that:
Benefits [of the rule] are difficult to measure because people
conceive of privacy primarily as a right, not as a commodity . . . .
However, it is possible to evaluate some of the benefits that may
accrue to individuals as a result of proposed regulation, and these
benefits, alone, suggest that the regulation is warranted. Added to
these benefits is the intangible value of privacy, the security that
individuals feel when personal information is kept confidential.
This benefit is very real and very significant but there are no
reliable means of measuring [the] dollar value of such benefit.65

Yet when the Department of Justice recently issued regulations
that were intended to control sexual abuse of prisoners, DOJ was
required to submit a CBA of the proposal to OIRA, following the
63. Id.
64. Kagan, supra note 48, at 2286.
65. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information Regulation
Preamble, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, (proposed Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 CFR pts. 160 and
164), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/PvcPre02.htm.
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66

guidelines of A-4. In a chilling report, forcible rape of an adult
prisoner was assigned a monetary value of -$310,000 or -$480,000,
while “contacts with a staff member that only involved touching of
the inmate’s buttocks, thigh, penis, breasts, or vagina in a sexual way”
67
were assigned a value of -$600 per incident.
This willingness to monetize even rape represents a major shift
from Clinton-era implementation of E.O. 12,866. OIRA originally
permitted the rulemaking agency to abstain from monetizing
significantly lesser invasions of privacy and dignity, respecting the
general understanding that some regulations protect rights that defy
commodification.
III. ALTHOUGH E.O. 12,866 IS INCOHERENT, ITS TEXT AND
HISTORY ESTABLISH THAT REGULATORY ANALYSES WERE
INTENDED TO ADDRESS DEONTOLOGICAL CONCERNS
Textbooks on policy analysis tend to use the phrase “cost-benefit
analysis” to refer very specifically to a formal economic analysis in
which, among other things, the present value of social welfare gains
and losses are identified, quantified, and expressed in the same
68
units. Historically, the analyses produced by agencies arguably have
not been true “cost-benefit analyses” within the narrow, technical
definition used in CBA textbooks, although they have indeed been
analyses that considered costs and benefits and are generally referred
69
to as “cost-benefit analyses.”
Instead, these prior CBAs might
include narrative descriptions of costs and benefits, with overt policy
discussions finding their way into the CBA weighting along with the

66. Melissa J. Luttrell, Bentham at the OMB: A Response to Professor Rowell, 64 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1013, 1029 (2012) [hereinafter Luttrell, Bentham].
67. Id. (quoting Regulatory Impact Assessment: Notice Of Final Rule For Prison Rape
Elimination Act (PREA) Standards at 24, 64 (May 17, 2012), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs/-pdfs/prea-ria.pdf).
For an excellent critique of this
monetization see Daniel A. Farber, Breaking Bad? The Uneasy Case for Regulatory Breakeven
Analysis 6–7 (Apr. 28, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2430263.
68. See, e.g., JUST ET AL., supra note 17, at 170–71 (providing detailed explanations of
different “money metrics” that may be used as proxies for utility); Amy Sinden, Formality and
Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/-papers.cfm?abstract_id=2442357 at 7–14 (describing in detail the
theoretical, welfare economics basics of this type of formal CBA).
69. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn, How Changes in the Federal Register Can Help Improve
Regulatory Accountability, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 927, 932 (2000) (“The authors of the [EPA]
report [did] not indicate if the agency was required to state specifically whether the benefits
justified the costs, or if the authors simply drew their own conclusions.”).
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70

monetary estimates.
Most of the CBAs produced under the Reagan and George H.W.
Bush administrations under Executive Order 12,291, E.O. 12,866’s
principal predecessor, in this way were quite different from the hightheory CBAs described in public policy texts. This practical result is
inevitable, regardless of an administration’s attitude toward health,
safety, and environmental regulation. The insurmountable difficulties
in quantification, monetization, and risk assessment prevent real
71
world agency analyses from resembling formal, textbook models.
E.O. 12,866’s predecessor, E.O. 12,291, provided: “Regulatory
action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society
72
for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society[.]” E.O.
12,866 was intended to soften the rigid CBA requirements of the
Reagan-era E.O 12,291 by removing the absolute requirement that
73
benefits outweigh costs to the extent permitted by law. As we have
seen, even E.O. 12,291 was not so rigid in its adherence to “hard”
CBA that the analyses it generated were limited to consideration of
only quantified and monetized inputs.
In its “regulatory philosophy” statement, E.O. 12,866 provides:
In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the
alternative of not regulating.
Costs and benefits shall be
understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest
extent that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative
measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but
nevertheless essential to consider. Further, in choosing among
alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those
approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential
economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other
advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute
requires another regulatory approach.74

70. See id. (“[Hahn] found that a large number (99%) of [regulatory impact] analyses
reported cost information; most (87%) reported a quantification of benefits; only a few (25%)
actually monetized those benefits; and even fewer (18%) reported that they found that
monetized benefits exceeded costs.”).
71. Luttrell, Differential Discounting, supra note 38, at 118 n.117.
72. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
73. Luttrell, Bentham, supra note 66, at 1030; Sinden, supra note 68, at 73–74.
74. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (emphasis added).
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The only way to read the language above as communicating
anything intelligible is to read it as calling for a balancing of
deontological ethical principles with the more welfarist/utilitarian
values reflected—albeit incompletely—in a policy wherein all inputs
to the analysis must be either monetized or omitted.
There is no obvious way to import the required concern for
“qualitative measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to
quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider” into an analysis that
monetizes “net benefits” without treating it as a type of quantitative
data. This complete quantification and monetization of all noneconomic values considered in the agency’s regulatory impact analysis
is not only unnecessary, under the text of the executive order it is
arguably forbidden.
Agencies cannot literally maximize all the listed types of
regulatory benefits, as “[i]t is not mathematically possible to
75
maximize for two (or more) variables at the same time.”
The
techniques used in mathematics to maximize (or minimize) one
variable or another necessarily imply that it is not possible to
76
simultaneously maximize two variables in an equation.
A particularly striking expression of the popular misunderstanding
about this pseudo-maximum problem is the famous statement
according to which the purpose of social effort is the ‘greatest
possible good for the greatest possible number.’ A guiding
principle cannot be formulated by the requirement of maximizing
two (or more) functions at once. Such a principle, taken literally, is
self-contradictory. (In general one function will have no maximum
where the other function has one.) It is no better than saying, e.g.,
that a firm should obtain maximum prices at maximum turnover, or
a maximum revenue at minimum outlay.77

This directive to maximize and minimize multiple concerns
occurs in E.O. 12,866 again, when “[t]o ensure that agencies’
regulatory programs are consistent with” the Order’s all-of-the-above

75. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243 (1968).
Concededly, simultaneous maximization of multiple variables could occur in theory if the
variables in regulatory analysis were related in such a way that maximizing one also maximizes
all. Though in such a case, the equation need only maximize a single variable to maximize all of
them, and the analyst should maximize that one variable.
76. Id. at 1243; JOHN VON NEUMANN AND OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THE THEORY OF
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 11 (1944).
77. NEUMANN, supra note 76, at 11.
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regulatory philosophy, the Order directs each agency to adhere to all
78
of the following principles, among others:









“design its regulations in the most cost-effective manner to
79
achieve the regulatory objective.”
“to the extent feasible, specify performance objectives,
rather than specifying the behavior or manner of
80
compliance that regulated entities must adopt.”
“assess the effects of Federal regulations on State, local,
and tribal governments, including specifically the
availability of resources to carry out those mandates, and
seek to minimize those burdens that uniquely or
significantly affect such governmental entities, consistent
81
with achieving regulatory objectives.”
“tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on society,
including individuals, businesses of differing sizes, and
other entities (including small communities and
governmental entities), consistent with obtaining the
82
regulatory objectives . . .[.]”
“draft its regulations to be simple and easy to understand,
with the goal of minimizing the potential for uncertainty
83
and litigation arising from such uncertainty.”
“assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended
regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits
are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation
only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of
84
the intended regulation justify its costs.”

As with the regulatory philosophy with which these principles
are meant to ensure consistency, it is impossible for an agency to
apply such competing directives in a literal way. For example, the
regulation that “imposes the least burden on society” might not

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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“minimiz[e] the potential for uncertainty and litigation arising from
uncertainty,” and/or might not also “to the extent feasible, specify
85
performance objectives[.]”
As with E.O. 12,866’s regulatory philosophy, the best reading
would allow agencies to make “reasoned determinations” without
monetizing intangible regulatory costs and benefits unless this
monetization of intangibles makes sense. It does not explicitly or
implicitly call for across-the-board formal quantitative CBA, using
the controversial techniques promoted at the time of A-4’s drafting
by industry-sponsored think tanks like the Harvard Center for Risk
86
Analysis (HCRA). Yet this is exactly what A-4 currently demands.
IV. CIRCULAR A-4 IS NOT THE GOLD STANDARD FOR
REGULATORY ANALYSIS
A. Intentional and Unintentional Bias
A significant function of OMB-supervised regulatory review has
always been straightforwardly political. It was thus under President
Reagan, when the modern era of OIRA-overseen regulatory review
87
began. This political gate-keeper/speed-check function has persisted
88
through to the current administration. And so, during a recession
year election when regulations were frequently characterized as “job89
killing,” the Obama administration was able to use OMB regulatory
85. Id.
86. The think tank former OIRA administrator John Graham directed immediately before
his appointment to OIRA. 147 CONG. REC. S7906-04 (2001) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (listing
corporate funders of Harvard Center for Risk Analysis (“HCRA”) and criticizing
methodologies used to assess risk regulation as biased against protective regulation); id.
(statement of Sen. Wellstone) (describing and criticizing the under-protective methodologies
employed at HCRA to assess risk regulation).
87. MILLER, supra note 39, at 2–4.
88. See COPELAND, supra note 55, at 4–5 (“From 1994 through 2011, the average amount
of time it took to complete a review was 51 days . . . . [I]n the first half of 2013, the average
review time was 140 days . . . .”); John M. Broder, Groups Sue After E.P.A. Fails to Shift Ozone
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/science
/earth/12epa.html?_r=0. (David Baron, a lawyer for Earthjustice environmental group,
addressed the Obama administration’s rejection of a stricter ozone standard, stating that
“instead of protecting people’s lungs as the law requires, [the Obama] administration based its
decision on politics, leaving tens of thousands of Americans at risk of sickness and suffering.”).
89. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Bashing EPA Is New Theme in GOP Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
18, 2011, at A1 (“In an earlier debate [Michele Bachmann] said the agency should be renamed
the ‘job-killing organization of America.’ She has called global-warming science a hoax.”);
Juliet Eilperin, EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Limits Affect Only New Power Plants, WASH. POST,
Mar. 28, 2012, at A16 (“‘We were successful in stopping their job-killing agenda through
legislation when we defeated cap-and-trade. Now our fight is to stop them from forcing it on the
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review to keep controversial regulations on ice, at least until after the
90
President Obama’s OIRA—as with the previous
election.
administration’s—will reportedly sometimes delay agencies’
submission of regulations to OIRA (or records them as having been
91
“submitted” later than they really are) because official submission
92
triggers a public notice.
While the purely political role of centralized regulatory review
persists, there is much more than bald politics to centralized
regulatory review. Reviews at OIRA are overseen by OIRA staffers
and administrators whose concerns surely include an earnest interest
in good policy making, and who do not appear to believe they are
93
94
manning the Death Star. The facially, though not actually, neutral
checkpoint that all economically significant executive agency
regulations must pass through, is careful review by OIRA for
95
compliance with A-4.
(EPA uses specialized guidelines for
regulatory review, but these are meant to operationalize A-4’s
96
requirements, not contradict or circumvent them. )

American people through regulations,’ said Sen. James M. Inhofe (Okla.), the top Republican
on the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee.”).
90. COPELAND, supra note 55, at 4 (“[B]y the first half of 2013, at least 17 departments and
agencies had average review times of more than 90 days (up from only two departments in
2011) . . . . [Agency employees explained this was due to] concerns by some in the Executive
Office of the President (EOP) about the issuance of potentially costly or otherwise controversial
rules during an election year[.]”).
91. Id. at 40–41 (“For example, the agency’s ‘NPDES Electronic Reporting Rule’ (2020AA47) was sent to OIRA on December 22, 2011, but was not ‘received’ by OIRA until nearly a
month later, on January 20, 2012”); see also Heinzerling, supra note 60, at 360 (noting the same
month-long time gap in the NPDES Electronic Reporting Rule).
92. See COPELAND, supra note 55, at 32 (explaining that OIRA administrator Howard
Shelanski in 2013 said that “unnecessary delays in review are harmful to everyone: to those who
are denied the benefits of regulation, to those wishing to comment on proposed rules and
influence policy, and to those who must plan for any changes the regulations require of them”).
93. Id. at 41–42; John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and
Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 400 (2008) [hereinafter Graham, Saving Lives].
94. See Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, supra note 37, at 387 n.290 (citing
William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory Muddle: The “Legislative Mirage” of Single
Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 298, 369–71 (1996) (explaining that CBA relies
on non-transparent political judgments)); Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting
the Cost of Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2018 (2002)
(“[M]any of these broad [CBA] assessments are based largely upon ex ante predictions, highly
ambitious assumptions, and very little empirical analysis of the actual costs that regulatees have
incurred in complying with particular regulations.”).
95. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, supra note 39, at 15 (“Indeed, regulatory agencies are
not beyond hiding policy judgments behind the “scientific” veneer of risk assessment.”).
96. U.S. EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 1-1 to 1-2 (2010),
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1. Formality vs. Informality
Over time, the A-4 methodologies have come to be regarded as
97
the “gold standard” of applied regulatory analysis. This Section
describes some of the controversial—and flat-out incorrect—
methodologies required by A-4. Because of these mistakes, even an
earnest attempt to apply A-4 methodologies to obtain an unbiased
result must necessarily fail.
First, the small piece of E.O. 12,866 that A-4 actually addresses,
directs agencies to assess prospective costs and benefits. It is not at
all clear that this therefore calls for a formal, quantitative cost-benefit
analysis of the sort required by A-4. Again, an evaluation of costs
and benefits can be a simple weighing of pros and cons, or a highly
elaborate welfare analysis that occupies several PhDs for several
months, and which follows years, or even decades, of data collection.
A-4 was drafted by OIRA Administrator John Graham and his
98
staff at a time when numerous prominent scholars contended that
OIRA promoted a formalistic CBA, which generated irrational
results that perverted the very laws being implemented through
99
regulation.
Professors Matthew Adler and Eric Posner aptly
described CBA’s reputation among academics across disciplines near
the time A-4 was drafted:
The reputation of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) among American
academics has never been as poor as it is today, while its popularity
among agencies in the United States government has never been
greater. Many law professors, economists, and philosophers
believe that CBA does not produce morally relevant information
and should not be used in project evaluation. A few commentators
argue that the information produced by CBA has some, but
limited, relevance. Defenders of CBA form an increasingly
beleaguered minority, consisting mostly of applied economists who
feel compelled to respond to attacks on the methodological
underpinnings of their work. Modern textbooks on CBA are
plentiful, and some of them are optimistic about the usefulness of

available
at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0568-50.pdf/$file/EE-056850.pdf.
97. Videotape: Administrative Conference of the United States: Committee on Regulation,
supra note 40, at 1:40:33.
98. John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush
Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 966–69 (2006).
99. E.g., Mathew D. Adler & Eric A Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE
L.J. 167, 167 (1999).
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the procedure, but most of them frankly acknowledge its serious
flaws and the inadequacy of the standard methods for correcting
these flaws.100

Nevertheless, A-4 enthusiastically embraces the methodologies
of this “beleaguered minority” of applied economists. A4 requires
that monetization and quantification are to be attempted whenever
101
possible. A4 demands discounting at a very high rate, higher even
102
than what most economists in the field advocate.
The document
also places a very high value on data collection—a policy that has
generally operated to prevent timely responses to known serious risks
103
because the status quo persists while the agency waits for data.
There were other, less rigid and formalistic, and—in the views of
many—better ways to compare pros and cons under E.O. 12,866. The
Order merely exhorts agencies to ensure costs “justify” benefits,
which could have been interpreted to require an evaluation of
alternatives including narrative descriptions of regulatory impacts,
and eschewing the controversial practice of discounting human and
104
environmental benefits.
As Professor Amy Sinden explains in an
excellent forthcoming article:
Informal CBA relies on qualitative descriptions intuitively
compared and purports to give no more than general guidance.
The most formal varieties of CBA, on the other hand, rely on
numbers and mathematics and purport, at least, to provide precise
answers. Informal CBA provides no more than a secondary check

100. Id. at 167. In the article, however, Professors Adler and Posner offer a qualified
defense of CBA.
101. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23.
102. See infra note 114 and accompanying text; see also McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State,
supra note 39, at 71–72 (“A high discount rate biases the analysis against future benefits, even
though ‘it is not clear why the later born should have to pay interest to induce their predecessors
not to exhaust [depletable resources].’” (quoting Michael S. Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An
Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 9 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 473, 488–89 (1980))).
103. See generally McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, supra note 39, at 26 (“The exceedingly
detailed risk assessments . . . have a huge potential to consume scarce agency resources and
delay rulemaking initiatives. The fact that much of the necessary information is within the
control of the regulated industry, which has every incentive to delay new regulations, only
exacerbates the potential for delay.”).
104. For an excellent description of how this approach might be implemented, see Sidney A.
Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation,
32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 469–83 (2008).
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on a decision that has been made by other means, while formal
CBA provides a standard-setting tool for identifying the optimal
choice from among a whole range of regulatory alternatives. And
between these two extremes lie yet more varieties of CBA.105

The language in E. O. 12,866 that A-4 implements does not
require the type of formal, quantitative CBA that relies heavily on
expensive and elaborate risk assessment protocols and controversial
monetization procedures to produce numerical “net benefit”
estimates. A-4 is far at the formal end of the CBA spectrum. It
instructs agencies to use a set of estimation procedures that, although
deeply entrenched after decades of use at OIRA, reflect neither good
106
economics nor good sense.
2. Why A-4 Methodologies Generate “Garbage Out” Results, Even
Given Accurate Inputs
Perhaps the strongest basis for inferring that A-4 reflects more
than pure, apolitical policy judgment, unfettered by other pressures, is
the specified discount rate. A-4 specifies that even for expenditures
during a recession, a range of values that includes an after-inflation
discount rate of 7% should be assessed and reported. This is
unjustifiable even under the A-4 logic, which reports that this rate
107
represents the “opportunity cost of capital.”
This opportunity cost theory assumes that, in the absence of
regulation, the inflation-adjusted annual growth in value of the
avoided costs would be 7%. But it is wildly implausible to assume
avoided regulatory costs would experience growth at this rate. For
example, if 7% is a firm’s return on investment after adjusting for
inflation, then achieving 7% annual growth in the value of all avoided
regulatory compliance costs would require 100% reinvestment of
these funds by the firm during the lifespan of the proposed regulation,
with zero consumption. Moreover:
[F]or regulations for which the costs, invested at the discount rate,
would not grow enough to exceed the expected benefits by the time
the benefits are to be realized (that is, for any regulation that passes
CBA under equal discounting), the problem is compounded. If all

105. Sinden, supra note 68, at 2–3.
106. See supra notes 98–106 and accompanying text; see infra notes 108–114 and
accompanying text.
107. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 34.
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the foregone costs are unlikely to be invested, it is still less likely
that a larger sum of money—i.e., the amount that would have to be
invested at the discount rate in order for the value of the
investment to equal the value of the regulatory benefits at the times
they would have occurred—would be invested as a direct result of a
regulator’s decision not to regulate.108

Many prominent economists and philosophers have persuasively
argued that human lives and other intangible goods should not be
discounted at all, since “harms to future generations deserve no less
109
protection than harms to the current generation.”
But among
academics who endorse formal, quantitative CBA with discounting,
the vast majority recommend a rate approaching the “social rate of
time preference,” which has been estimated to be a real (that is, after110
inflation) rate of between one and three percent.
Additionally,
economists generally recommend substantially lower rates for
protections meant to benefit future generations, as in the climate
111
change context. There is simply no sound economic or ethical basis
112
for requiring agencies to use the 7% rate in regulatory analyses.
The 7% discount rate greatly undervalues all benefits that are
expected to accrue in the future, and thus seriously distorts evaluation
of the benefits of public protection. This requirement to report
benefits under an unreasonably high discount rate is—and always has
been—a normative choice, one masquerading as objective economics.
It is also a choice that does not reflect the United States’ expressed
preferences, as a nation that cares about children’s welfare
(evidenced by the protective agendas of major public health and
environmental statutes that agencies are charged with
113
implementing).
When John Graham began his tenure at OIRA, he had already
108. Luttrell, Differential Discounting, supra note 38, at 112 (emphasis added).
109. Edward R. Morrision, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory CostBenefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333, 1338–39 (1998); see also Lisa Heinzerling,
Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2025–29 (1999); McGarity, supra
note 39, at 71–72; Richard L. Revesz & Matthew R. Shahabian, Climate Change and Future
Generations, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1104–06 (2011).
110. JUST ET AL., supra note 17, at 580.
111. Martin L. Weitzman, Gamma Discounting, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 260, 267–68 (2001).
112. See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 109, at 1110–15 (discussing economic basis for
decreasing discount rates in future).
113. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7545(b)(4)(A)(i) (2012) (requiring administrator to conduct study
on the effects that the increased use of certain chemicals in gasoline have on public health).
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acknowledged a real discount rate of 7% was too high for evaluating
114
The prevailing view among
public health and safety regulations.
academic experts was also that 7% was significantly too high for
115
evaluating health, safety, and environmental regulations.
Yet he
claimed one of his major achievements as OIRA Administrator was
the change in required methodology that specified the discount rate
116
to be used for regulatory review would be both 7% and 3%. One
wonders what—given the other major changes Graham made to the
status quo—kept Graham from eliminating the 7% rate altogether,
given that he believed the rate was too high and that the 3% real rate
117
was better.
Similarly, prior to becoming OIRA Administrator, Professor
Cass Sunstein was on record criticizing A-4’s call for both a 7% real
rate and a 3% real rate, since the 7% rate seemed “badly outmoded”
118
to Sunstein in 2007. Yet, during his three years as head of OIRA,
agencies were required to prepare analyses under both rates.
Although the 7% rate enjoys little support among experts, it
nevertheless plays a very influential role since it is politically difficult
for agencies to produce regulations that have “net costs” under either
rate. It is puzzling that it has never been eliminated, especially during
a sustained recession, when even the opportunity cost arguments that
once supported the 7% rate among a minority of economists were
unavailable.
Other examples of anti-regulation biases that have persisted
through each version of OMB’s methodological guidelines on CBA
include the manner in which regulatory costs and benefits are
119
quantified and monetized.
As applied, these requirements have

114. E.g., Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social
Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS
FROM REGULATION 167, 169 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996) (employing as well as advocating use
of a five percent discount rate); see also Graham, Saving Lives, supra note 93, at 504 (writing
less than two years after stepping down as OIRA Administrator that “many past [CBAs] have
used discount rates (e.g., 7% or 10% per year) for future health benefits that we now realize are
too high.”).
115. Graham, Saving Lives, supra note 93, at 504 n.471.
116. Id., at 504; see also OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 33–34.
117. See id. at 504 (describing 7% rate as “too high” and describing a methodological change
that gave “stronger consideration” to the 3% rate as an improvement to the regulatory review
process, even though agencies were still requested to use both rates in their analyses).
118. Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money,
and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171, 206 n.126 (2007).
119. See Luttrell, Differential Discounting, supra note 38, at 82–83 n.9 (collecting OMB
guidance documents implementing the cost-benefit analysis requirements of Executive Order
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systematically undervalued regulatory benefits, which tend to be
more difficult than costs to quantify and monetize, while the process
120
for estimating costs often produces inflated numbers.
In addition,
even when implementing protective statutory language, agencies are
directed not to be conservative in their assumptions regarding risks to
public health and the environment, but instead to use less protective
121
“best estimates” of risk. This is another practice that, as a practical
matter, reduces flexibility in standard setting and likely causes
agencies systematically to underestimate the need for regulatory
protections. This “best estimate” language does not exist in E.O.
12,866, though the Order does contain flexible language allowing
agencies to use the “best reasonably obtainable information
concerning the need for, and consequences of, the intended
122
regulation.”
A-4’s default rule managing risk regulation requires
that agencies give preference to less protective, central estimates of
risk, thereby possibly delaying time-sensitive regulation until the
“best available” information is obtained.
A-4’s default rule
undermines E.O. 12,866’s more flexible “reasonably obtainable”
language.
B. Peer Review and Public Comment
A-4 supporters, including OIRA administrators under
Republican and Democratic administrations, endorse it as the
12291, and its successor, Executive Order 12,866).
120. LISA HEINZERLING, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, COMMENTS FROM THE
CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION ON DRAFT OMB REPORT AND COST-BENEFIT
GUIDELINES (Apr. 3, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
assets/omb/inforeg/2003 report/251.pdf.
121. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 42. A-4 provides:
It is a common practice to compare the “best estimates” of both benefits and costs
with those of competing alternatives. These “best estimates” are usually the
average or the expected value of benefits and costs. Emphasis on these expected
values is appropriate as long as society is “risk neutral” with respect to the
regulatory alternatives. While this may not always be the case, you should in
general assume “risk neutrality” in your analysis.
Id. For a discussion of why conservative assumptions in risk assessments lead to more stringent
standards, see McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, supra note 39, at 27–29. For a recent discussion
of how a more precautionary stance might be imported into CBA, and why “to the extent that
CBA does not adequately address catastrophic risk, it egregiously violates the precautionary
principle,” see David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can
They Be Reconciled?, 43 MICH. ST. L. REV. 771, 806 (2013).
122. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
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123

product of peer review and a public notice-and-comment process.
124
They also claim it reflects mainstream economic consensus.
However, A-4 was developed by OMB through a flawed process, so it
is unsurprising that the final document retained the serious
substantive biases described above.
One of the goals of peer review is to ensure quality; for example,
academic peer reviewers are expected to identify flaws and suggest
125
improvements. For this to occur, the selection of peer reviewers is
determinative. Diverse viewpoints are necessary to avoid review by
an echo chamber of extremely like-minded “peers.”
All seven of A-4’s peer reviewers were economists or law
professors who endorsed the controversial applied welfare economics
126
approach to regulatory review. This means that implementing the
relevant language in the Executive Order excluded many viewpoints

123. See, e.g., Rulemaking Process and the Unitary Executive Theory Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, 110th Cong. 6–7 (2008) (testimony of
Susan E. Dudley, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs).
124. Graham, Saving Lives, supra note 93, at 452 n.259 (“Both OMB Circular A-4 and the
OMB’s annual report to Congress on the costs and benefits of federal regulations are produced
through a process that includes peer review by leading scholars in the fields of BCA and
administrative law, as well as public comment.”); see also Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra
note 29, at 172–73 (“[i]t is noteworthy that Circular A-4 was issued in the George W. Bush
Administration and continues in the Obama Administration; its longevity attests to its technical
character”).
125. Reviewing Peer Review, 4 NATURE IMMUNOLOGY 297 (2003), available at http://www.
nature.com/ni/journal/v4/n4/full/ni0403-297.html.
126. The peer reviewers of A-4 were Cass Sunstein, Lester Lave, Milton C. Weinstein,
James K. Hammitt, Kerry Smith, Jonathan Weiner, Douglas K. Owens, and W. Kip Viscusi.
OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 1. The followings works, all of which were published
before the requests to peer review A-4, are examples of scholarship, authored by the peer
reviewers, all of which endorses or employs CBA (and/or its close cousin, cost-effectiveness
analysis) as a decision tool in policymaking: RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1997);
James K. Hammitt & John D. Graham, Willingness to Pay for Health Protection: Inadequate
Sensitivity to Probability?, 18 J. OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 33 (1999); Lester B. Lave & Satish V.
Joshi, Benefit Cost Analysis in Public Health, 17 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 203 (1996); V. Kerry
Smith & Ju-Chin Huang, Can Markets Value Air Quality? A Meta-Analysis of Hedonic Property
Value Models, 103 J. OF POL. ECON. 209 (1995); CASS SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY,
LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002); Milton Weinstein et al., Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of
AIDS Prevention Programs: Concepts, Complications, and Illustrations, in AIDS: SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR AND INTRAVENOUS DRUG USE 471 (C.F. Turner et al. eds., 1989); W. Kip Viscusi
& Joni Hersch, Cigarette Smokers as Job Risk Takers, 83 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 203, 269–80
(2001).
This set of academics was highly biased toward those who promoted more formal,
quantitative welfare analyses than what would have been strictly necessary to satisfy Executive
Order 12,866’s direction that costs be evaluated to determine whether they “justify” benefits.
There is no dispute that any of the above-listed peer reviewers are excellent scholars.
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opposed to this use of formal, quantitative CBA, which, at the time,
127
was endorsed by only a “beleaguered minority” of academics.
Critics of using formal, quantitative CBA to assist in making
regulatory decisions would not have been difficult to locate; these
scholars were publishing numerous law review articles and testifying
on Capitol Hill against efforts to expand CBA’s influence even
further. For example, Professors Sidney Shapiro and Thomas
McGarity, legal scholars who were among the many academics who
published and testified before Congress on CBA methodological
issues during this time period, held endowed chairs at the University
128
of Kansas and the University of Texas, respectively.
The draft guidelines were emailed to prospective peer reviewers
by then Administrator of OIRA, Professor John Graham. Most of
these peer reviewers were either his recent co-authors, fellow
affiliates of AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
former close collaborators, or recent colleagues at HCRA (a think
tank he directed immediately before taking over as OIRA
administrator).
Furthermore, the phrase “peer reviewed” was used here with a
much different meaning than it has in academia, and the process used
was inadequate to ensure quality control. No obligation existed for
Circular A-4 to satisfy independent peer reviewers or, as in academia,
an impartial editor. Instead, its authors could take what suggestions
they liked and ignore the rest.
129
The draft guidelines that were emailed to prospective peer
reviewers by Professor Graham reflect many of his policy priorities
130
while at HCRA.
Two of the peer reviewers had worked with

127. Adler & Posner, supra note 99, at 167.
128. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Curriculum Vitae, available at http://law.wfu.edu/faculty/assets/
profile/cv/cv.shapirsa.pdf; Thomas O. McGarity, Curriculum Vitae, available at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/cvs/tom56_cv.pdf; Public Health and Natural Resources: A
Review of the Implementation of our Environmental Laws—Parts I and II Hearings Before the
Committee on Gov. Affairs, 107th Cong. 42–46 (March 7, 2002) (testimony of Thomas O.
McGarity, W. J. Kronzer Chair, University of Texas Law School).
129. See, e.g., E-mail exchange between John Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget and Kerry Smith, Faculty Emeritus, Dep’t of Econ., N.C.
State Univ. (Feb. 9, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb
/assets/omb/inforeg/2003report/5.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
130. Compare OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, with Clean Air Act: Review and
Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and
Nuclear Safety, Committee on Environment and Public Works, 106th Cong. 85–90 (1999)
(statement of John D. Graham, Director, Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public
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Professor Graham at HCRA prior to Graham’s appointment as
131
these two reviewers should have been
OIRA administrator;
excluded due to conflicts of interest. The common-sense guideline
132
that excludes former “close collaborators” from the set of eligible
peer reviewers would have excluded these two former colleagues,
who had co-authored numerous articles with him, in addition to a
third scholar who co-authored a book with Professor Graham and a
133
Thus, four of the seven
fourth who authored its foreword.
reviewers had real or apparent conflicts of interest that should have
excluded them from A-4’s peer reviewers.
The remaining three peer reviewers and Professor Graham were
among the academics who signed an amicus brief sponsored by the
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies and filed in
134
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations.
The brief was filed
135
less than a year before Professor Graham’s nomination. The brief

Health).
131. According to the October 1996 issue of Risk in Perspective, a publication of The
Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Milton Weinstein “founded” HCRA in 1995. See Milton C.
Weinstein, Panel Issues Standards for Cost Effective Analysis, 4 RISK IN PERSPECTIVE 6 (Oct.
1996), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1273/2013/06/PanelIssues-Standards-Oct-96.pdf; but see John D. Graham, School of Pub. & Envtl. Affairs, Ind.
Univ., Curriculum Vitae at 2, available at www.indiana.edu/~spea/. . ./vita/ graham_john_cv.pdf\
(Professor Graham’s CV lists his position as “founding director” of HCRA from 1989 to 2001).
While this timeline is somewhat confusing, it seems safe to infer they worked together at HCRA
at the same time. Professor Graham was also described as the Director of HCRA at the same
time A-4 peer reviewer and current HCRA Director James Hammitt was on the faculty at
HCRA. See Edmond Toy, John D. Graham & James K Hammit, Fueling Heavy Duty Trucks:
Diesel or Natural Gas, 8 RISK IN PERSPECTIVE 1 (Jan. 2000), available at http://www.hsph.
harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1273/2013/06/RISK_IN_PERSP_JANUARY2000.pdf
(Hammit and Graham co-authored this article for the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis.).
132. RULES AND REGULATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
58 Fed. Reg. 45,409-01 (Aug. 30, 1993).
133. SUNSTEIN, RISK V. RISK, supra note 126, at vii–xii.
134. Brief Amici Curiae of AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies et al.
supporting Cross-Petitioners at 13–18, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (No. 99426) (2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2000/7/
naaqs%20litan/07_naaqs_litan.pdf. Notably, Professors Graham, Sunstein, and Viscusi held
contemporaneous positions on the Council of Academic Advisers for the AEI-Brookings Joint
Center for Regulatory Studies. Id. at iii.
135. Id. at i; see also U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
Nominations Hearing: John D. Graham to be Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs at the Office of Management and Budget, Angela Styles to be Administrator of
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and Steven A. Perry to be Administrator of the General
Services
Administration,
SENATE.GOV
(May
17,
2001
10:00
a.m.),
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/nominations-hearing_john-d-graham-to-be-administratorof-the-office-of-information-and-regulatory-affairs-at-the-office-of-management-and-budgetangela-styles-to-be-administrator-of-the-office-of-federal-procurement-policy-and-steven-a-
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contended that CBA “can help promote the design of better
regulations by providing a sensible framework for comparing the
alternatives involved in any regulatory choice,” and supported
136
considering cost in determining ambient air quality standards.
This surely does not amount to “recent co-authorship” such that
any of these peer reviewers would be disqualified from peer
reviewing Professor Graham’s work in a well-regarded journal for
137
this reason alone.
However, it is significant that even these three
peer reviewers—possibly the only peer reviewers of A-4 who would
not have been disqualified due to conflict of interest concerns from
peer reviewing a scholarly publication by Professor Graham—had
demonstrated themselves to be politically active in advocating for an
even greater role for CBA in rulemaking, just like Professor Graham.
At the time A-4 was circulated as a draft, prospective peer
reviewers existed who would likely have proposed other operational
guidelines for the agencies. For example, guidelines that relied more
on reasoned judgment than on the quasi-scientific formulae promoted
by the beleaguered champions of a regulatory decision-making
scheme driven by fully monetized CBA and by CBA’s close relative,
138
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA).
The numerous skeptics of this
HCRA-style CBA and CEA who were writing at the time might have
proposed ways to present regulatory impacts that depended less on
monetization and would better balance consequentialist and
139
deontological concerns.
Some of these potential peer reviewers
140
even commented on A-4 when it was presented as a draft.
In addition, while public comments were solicited, there was no

perry-to-be-administrator-of-the-general-services-administration (nominating Graham to be
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in 2001).
136. See id.
137. SARA ROCKWELL, YALE UNIV. OFFICE OF RESEARCH INTEGRITY, ETHICS OF PEER
REVIEW:
A
GUIDE
FOR
MANUSCRIPT
REVIEWERS
7,
available
at
http://radonc.yale.edu/Images/Ethical_Issues_in_Peer_ Review_tcm307-34211.pdf (last visited
Dec. 28, 2014) (“In general, you should not review papers written by people you have
collaborated with or published with in the recent past.”).
138. These two forms of welfare analyses are closely related and rely on many of the same
tools, such as discounting. CEA produces ratios showing how programs aimed at achieving the
same goal compare; in cost-effectiveness analysis (unlike CBA), either the costs or the benefits
are fixed, and results are expressed as, for example, lives (or acres of wilderness) saved per
dollar. See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 9–12.
139. Examples of such scholars include Lisa Heinzerling, Sidney Shapiro, and Thomas
McGarity, among many others.
140. E.g., Heinzerling, supra note 120.
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“notice and comment” in the sense in which that term is used for
rulemakings under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). A
crucial difference is that in APA rulemakings the rulemaking agency
must provide a reasonable, non-arbitrary response to commenters or
face possible legal consequences for moving forward in the face of
commenter criticism. Here, OMB was able to unilaterally decide
when it had adequately addressed commenters’ concerns, with
commenters from the affected public having no recourse analogous to
the affected public’s standing to sue under the APA. Thus, to say the
141
OMB guidelines were subject to “public notice and comment” is
misleading, since the phrase evokes notice-and-comment procedures
under the APA, which have teeth.
V. THE UNCOMFORTABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A-4 AND THE
SOCIAL COST OF CARBON
In addition to the harm A-4 creates directly by pushing
regulations toward less stringency for irrational reasons, A-4 has also
142
143
144
provided grounds for legislators, academics, interest groups, and
145
think tank analysts to criticize the administration’s estimated social
cost of carbon (SCC) (the monetized value of a marginal metric ton
of carbon pollution avoided). The administration’s estimated SCC
also reflects the avoidance of an equivalent metric ton of carbon in
the form of another GHG. Critics of EPA’s proposed existing power
plant rule and other rules that incorporate the SCC into their CBAs
have used A-4 as the basis for opposing these regulations, arguing
that the SCC fails to “follow the rules.” Following the rules here
141. Administrative Conference of the United States: Committee on Regulation, supra note
40, at 1:40:23; Graham, Valuing the Future, supra note 41, at 51; Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions,
supra note 29, at 201.
142. Supra notes 23, 26–27 and accompanying text.
143. GAYER & VISCUSI, supra note 19, at 8.
144. Robert P. Murphy, Power Plant Rule Fails Administration’s Own Cost/Benefit Test,
INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (June 2, 2014), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/
power-plant-rule-fails-administrations-costbenefit-test/#; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INST.
FOR 21ST CENTURY ENERGY, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF POTENTIAL NEW CARBON DIOXIDE
REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2014), available at http://www.energyxxi.org/sites/
default/files/file-tool/Assessing_the_Impact_of_Potential_New_Carbon_Regulations_in_the_
United_States.pdf.
145. PATRICK J. MICHAELS & PAUL C. KNAPPENBERGER, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF
SCIENCE, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET’S REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON THE
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT ENTITLED TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF
CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 2 (Feb. 26,
2014), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/omb_scc_comments_
michaels_knappenberger.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2014); Murphy, supra note 144.
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means complying with A-4 methodological provisions that are wrong.
For example, legislation was introduced in the House that would
require EPA to produce additional analyses of emissions limits on
power plants using “best available methods,” defined as analyses
146
“consistent with guidance from . . . Circular A-4.”
Interestingly, the divergence from OMB methodologies does
more than just inflate the SCC. For example, by valuing foreign lives
in developing nations at a lower value than U.S. lives, the SCC
estimates are lower than they would be if they employed the
estimated value of a life saved (or lost) within the range OMB
endorses. Valuing all lives at the same rate used to value American
lives in the same CBAs would have greatly increased the value of
reducing GHG emissions within the United States.
A. Background on the Social Cost of Carbon
The costs and benefits of regulations promulgated under
President Obama’s Climate Action Plan are being assessed using
valuations of climate harms that were generated by an Inter-Agency
147
Working Group (IWG) convened for this purpose.
In 2013, the
IWG’s initial 2010 figures were updated to reflect updates in its
underlying models; these 2013 updates significantly increased the
148
SCC figures.
The impetus for the IWG’s initial SCC estimates was a decision
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
forbidding agencies from ignoring the costs and benefits of
149
monetizable climate harms when using CBA to set standards. That
case arose in 2006 when the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) used the monetizable social cost and
146. H.R. 2948, 113th Cong. (2013).
147. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COSTS OF CARBON, TECHNICAL
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/
regulations/scc-tsd.pdf [hereinafter 2010 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SCC]; The Social
Cost of Carbon, U.S. EPA (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPA
activities/economics/scc.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
148. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COSTS OF CARBON, TECHNICAL
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 2 (Nov. 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/technical-update-social-cost-ofcarbon-for-regulator-impact-analysis.pdf [hereinafter 2013 TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SCC].
149. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508, 558
(9th Cir. 2007), vacated and reh’g denied, 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).
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benefit inputs in its CBA to identify the fuel economy standard that
150
was the most cost-beneficial. After considering incorporation of a
monetized value for carbon dioxide emissions in its 2003 proposed
rule, the agency ultimately declined to monetize carbon dioxide when
setting the 2006 final rule, which meant that the value of avoiding
carbon dioxide emissions was not considered when NHTSA set its
151
standard. The following year, the Ninth Circuit found the agency’s
failure to factor in the value of carbon dioxide emissions to be
arbitrary and capricious, explaining that while various experts’
monetary estimations left the agency with a range of estimates for the
value of carbon dioxide—many of them centering on approximately
$50 per metric ton of carbon dioxide, with others ranging as low as
152
$3—the monetizable value of this benefit was surely not $0.
The purpose of the SCC estimates is to allow agencies to
incorporate the social benefits of reducing GHG emissions into
CBAs. Like A-4, it is intended to direct agencies in implementing the
CBA requirements of E.O. 12,866. According to the IWG, “the SCC
is an estimate of the monetized damages associated with an
153
incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given year.”
It is
intended to value changes in agricultural productivity, human health
impacts, property damage, and environmental impacts from climate
154
change.
The IWG’s 2013 increases to SCC estimates were initially rolled
155
out quietly in an energy conservation rule for microwave ovens.
These increases generated a great deal of controversy, with the House
of Representatives even passing legislation that would prohibit

150. Id. at 523–27.
151. Id.; Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, 71
Fed. Reg. 17,566, 17,589 (Apr. 6, 2006) (“On the benefit side, for example, there is a significant
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, which cannot be monetized. There is no agreement in
the literature on values or range of values for monetizing such a benefit to the United States.”).
152. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 508 F.3d at 533; see also Masur & Posner, supra note 21, at
1557–63 (summarizing agencies’ decisions to begin including value for Social Cost of Carbon
(SCC) in their regulator CBAs on an ad hoc basis).
153. 2013 TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SCC, supra note 148, at 2.
154. Id.
155. Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Standby Mode and
Off Mode for Microwave Ovens, 78 Fed. Reg. 36,316, 36,349–52 (Jun. 17, 2013) (amended 10
C.F.R. pts. 429, 430); see also New Energy Efficiency Standards for Microwave Ovens to Save
Consumers on Energy Bills, ENERGY.GOV (May 31, 2013), http://energy.gov/articles/newenergy-efficiency-standards-microwave-ovens-save-consumers-energy-bills (last visited Nov. 4,
2014).
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156

agencies from using the SCC in certain large energy rules.
In a
Senate hearing shortly after the updates to the SCC were announced,
newly appointed OIRA Administrator Howard Shelanski faced
criticism for OIRA’s failure to circulate the update for public
comment, and was questioned on the failure to follow A-4’s
157
methodology.
In response to this uproar, OMB opened the 2013
158
So far, it has not officially
SCC update to public comment.
responded to comments.
Congressional opposition to the SCC has continued. Senator
Vitter and 31 co-sponsors introducing a resolution condemning
EPA’s CBAs of its proposed and final rules setting limits on new and
159
existing power plant GHG emissions.
The proposed resolution
condemns EPA for, among other things, “fail[ing] to provide a
complete assessment of the economic costs imposed by the proposed
160
rules or the benefits that may result.”
B. A-4 Is an Internal Management Document Created by Executive
Fiat Under the George W. Bush Administration, and the Obama
Administration Can Freely Ignore It
For all the reasons described above, A-4 is not the right way for
regulators to evaluate regulations under E.O. 12,866. And it is
certainly the wrong tool for evaluating climate change policy: A-4
openly acknowledges its requirements do a poor job of valuing
161
intergenerational benefits.
Fortunately, IWG was not required to
use A4 analysis to arrive at the SCC.
Yet legislators, policymakers, scholars, and think tank analysts
have repeatedly criticized the IWG’s recommendations for failing to
162
comply with some of A-4’s requirements in deriving the SCC. The
substance of the claims that the particular methodologies in dispute

156. H.R. 1582, 113th Cong. (2013).
157. Examining the Obama Administration’s Social Cost of Carbon Estimates: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee On Energy Policy, Health Care And Entitlements of the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, 113th Cong. 17–19 (2013) (questioning of Howard
Shelanski, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management
and Budget, regarding the omission of the 7% rate).
158. The public comment period ended in January of 2014.
159. S. Res. 512, 113th Cong. (2014).
160. Id. at 4.
161. See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 35–36 (summarizing criticisms of A-4’s
method of valuing intergenerational benefits).
162. E.g., supra notes 141–144.
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would have produced better results is taken up below. But, as a
threshold matter, this “inconsistency” criticism is easily and
completely answered with: “so what?” No outside group or legislator
is entitled to have the agencies comply with A-4, which are OMB’s
purely internal guidelines and which were never promulgated as a
163
rule or enacted as a law. Even E.O. 12,866, A-4’s parent executive
164
order, is not enforceable by anyone outside the executive branch.
With the stroke of a pen, President Obama could eliminate E.O.
12,866’s CBA requirements, which only exist and persist by executive
fiat.
This simple principle seems to elude many of the most powerful
and influential critics of the SCC. For example, in one of the oddest
examples of lawmakers seeming to misunderstand this simple
procedural matter, the House passed H.R. 1582, The Energy
165
Consumers Relief Act of 2013.
Included in the passed version of
the bill was the Murphy Amendment, which provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any executive order,
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency may
not use the social cost of carbon in order to incorporate social
benefits of reducing carbon dioxide emissions, or for any other
reason, in any cost-benefit analysis relating to an energy-related
rule that is estimated to cost more than $1 billion unless and until a
Federal law is enacted authorizing such use.166

Even if this bill were to become law, OMB could unilaterally
revoke A-4 and thereby eliminate the need for formalized CBA (and
with it, the need for the SCC) in RIAs altogether. No legislative
CBA requirement exists that could stop President Obama’s Climate

163. See Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29, at 172 (explaining that A-4 is an
authoritative document that sets out only internal requirements and is not a law).
164. This is fortunate since, for the reasons described in Part III, E.O. 12,866 is literally
impossible to comply with fully. If outside actors could block regulations that do not comply
fully with every provision in 12,866, this would shut down rulemaking. Exec. Order No. 12,866,
58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (“This Executive order is intended only to improve the
internal management of the Federal Government and does not create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its
agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.”); see also Chen v.
Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1339 (4th Cir. 1995) (“A court should not enforce an executive order
intended for the internal management of the President’s cabinet.”); Sunstein, Thirty-Six
Questions, supra note 29, at 172.
165. See supra note 155.
166. Id.
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Action Plan from proceeding. The current, central role of formal,
quantified CBA in the rulemaking process only exists at the pleasure
of the President. No stakeholder outside the executive branch is
167
entitled to demand compliance with E.O. 12,866, let alone to insist
on compliance with the flawed methodological guidelines
168
implementing it.
C. Criticism of SCC for Not “Following the Rules” of A-4: The Merits
of the Substantive Case
Although, for the reasons described above, the administration
has absolutely no obligation to require agency compliance with A-4,
this subpart evaluates the substance of the A-4 provisions at issue.
The following criticism of the SCC, taken from joint comments of
eleven conservative think tanks, is representative of similar criticism
that has come from legislators, academics, interest groups, and think
169
tank analysts:
The IWG chose not to use a 7% discount rate to calculate the
present value of future CO2 emission reductions, and not to report
separate SCC values for the U.S. domestic economy. Those choices
inflate the hypothetical value of CO2 emission reductions and
conflict with OMB Circular A-4.170

These two recurring complaints, that the IWG should have used a 7%
discount rate and that it should have reported separate SCC values
that excluded non-U.S. damages, will be taken up in turn.
1. Discount Rates for Climate Benefits Are, if Anything, Too High
a. Reporting Only Rates that Are Lower than 7% Is Correct
The decisions the United States makes now, regarding domestic
and global mitigation and adaptation policies, will help determine

167. See Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29, at 172 (explaining that E.O. 12,866
and A-4 as authoritative documents “bind executive agencies even though they lack the force of
law.”).
168. See id.
169. See supra notes 142–145.
170. Comment on the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Notice: Technical Support
Documents: Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis under Executive
Order No. 12866, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Feb. 26, 2014) available at http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2013-0007-0101.

15_Luttrell_PublishedVersion (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2014]

THE SOCIAL COST OF INERTIA

1/15/2015 6:05 PM

171

what the world will be like centuries into the future. For agency
analysts completing CBAs for regulations addressing climate change,
this creates a logically and ethically difficult accounting problem.
Due to the enormous time lag between current social costs and the
time when some of the distant future benefits will be experienced, the
discount rate—the rate used to convert future costs and benefits to
present value in CBA—is extremely powerful in the SCC analysis. If
the lives and wellbeing of people who live 300 years from now are
discounted at the rates agencies use for shorter-term, infragenerational analyses, then almost no weight at all will be given to the
welfare of the distant future.
As A-4 itself acknowledges,
intergenerational discounting creates difficult normative questions of
171
justice and fairness that economics cannot objectively solve.
Broadly speaking, there are three rationales for discounting
intangible benefits at rates as high as 3% and 7%, which A-4 specifies
as appropriate for most domestic regulations.
They are: (1)
descriptive discounting, in which discount rates are understood to
reflect people’s actual preference for obtaining regulatory benefits
172
sooner rather than later; (2) prescriptive discounting, where the
discount rate is intended to reflect our best ethical judgment about
173
what future benefits ought to be worth to us; and (3) opportunity
cost discounting, where the discount rate is justified by the foregone
174
benefits of other competing investments not undertaken.
The first place to look for insight into how a regulation’s benefits
should be discounted is the statute under whose authority the
regulation is to be promulgated. Statutes used to protect the distant
future, like the Clean Air Act, generally have protective intentions.
Thus, for the regulatory benefits of climate change mitigation, this
175
inquiry will generally yield a “prescriptive” rate or “growth” rate.
Both the prescriptive and growth rates would be lower than the 3%
176
rate specified in A-4.
In the climate change context, the principal objections to very

171. See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 35–36 (discussing various techniques that
can be used in intergenerational discounting).
172. Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 109, at 1107.
173. Id. at 1104.
174. See id. at 1110 (discussing opportunity cost discounting).
175. See id. at 1109 (estimating that growth discounting would lead to an intergenerational
discount rate of 2.4%).
176. See id. at 1104–06, 1109 (describing estimates of growth and prescriptive discount rates,
the latter of which is frequently posited to be zero).
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low discounting—including the objection that agencies should
consider the value of chimerical alternatives, such as immunizations
programs, with higher “rates of return”—are incoherent outside the
purely hypothetical context of an omnipotent global decision maker.
When EPA is determining whether to allow power plants to inflict
damage on the distant future, the agency has no power to divert any
foregone regulatory compliance costs to alternative investments.
Because such opportunity costs of not-actually-displaced, wholly
theoretical social investments are not representative of actual
opportunities agencies can elect, they are not legitimate reasons to
devalue the harms agency regulations seek to avoid.
A problem with CBA is that very low discount rates may appear
too low to use for costs. To the extent these are monetary costs or
actual market goods, they are conventionally investible or
consumable and do have a time value that reflects this. This means it
might not make intuitive sense to devalue short-term monetary costs
at the same rate as distant benefits, even if the analyst chooses to
assign some discount rate to each.
177
One solution is to use a declining discount rate. Another is to
simply use different rates for different CBA inputs, as described
below.
b. Differential Discounting Within RIAs Is Not “Absurd”
In 2010, after reviewing both the existing literature and the
applicable OMB guidelines on cost-benefit analysis, the IWG
promoted the use of a 3% discount rate for carbon emissions. While
it also reported values at a 2.5% rate and a 5% rate, agencies have
178
largely adopted the 3% “central estimate.” The primary support in
the literature for the 3% rate comes from assessing alternative rates
of return on displaced consumption. In other words, it is a rate
premised on the economic value of the costs of regulation. However,
once one accepts that the discount rate used for costs need not be
179
identical to the rate used for benefits, then a discrete logical and/or

177. See generally M. Weitzman & C. Gollier, How Should the Distant Future be Discounted
When Discount Rates are Uncertain?, 107 ECON. LETTERS 350 (2010) (concluding that discount
rates must decline over time when “future discount rates are uncertain but have a permanent
component.”).
178. See Masur & Posner, supra note 21, at 1561, 1566 (discussing agencies reliance on IWG
discount rate of 3%).
179. See Luttrell, supra note 38, at 128 (concluding that OMB should “reconsider its long-
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normative justification for the application of a 3% rate to benefits is
also needed. The interagency committee does not supply such a
justification, and what rationales exist in the literature for discounting
intergenerational benefits at rates as high as 3% are unconvincing.
Because the IWG did not compute an SCC at a 7% discount
rate, commentators have complained that agencies cannot use a
consistent discount rate in the CBAs prepared for OMB review at the
7% rate. As one critic argued:
We thus have an absurd situation, in which EPA and other
regulatory agencies will be following the rules and calculating
benefits and costs at both the 3 percent and 7 percent discount
rates. Yet, when they express the “social benefits” of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions at the 7 percent rate, they are actually
going to plug in the wrong number, and explain in a footnote why
they are doing so.180

As I demonstrate in an earlier paper, The Case for Differential
Discounting, it is simply not true that all benefits considered in CBAs
must always be discounted at the same rate as costs to avoid perverse
181
or absurd outcomes.
While this type of discounting is now an
unusual practice, that doesn’t make it wrong. Again, entrenched is
not the same as correct.
It is true that because the IWG did not report SCC values at the
7% discount rate, agencies will no longer be discounting all “goods”
at 7%. Nevertheless, if the best reason to continue discounting noncommodity benefits—no matter what they are, and even if they are
already reported and discounted separately from other inputs—at a
7% rate is that “A-4 says so” or that it is “standard practice,” then it
would be better to abandon this practice.
2. Reporting Global Benefits Is Appropriate
Many have argued the SCC should omit considering impacts
outside of the United States, including externalized harms suffered by

standing directive that executive agencies must always discount health and environmental
benefits at the same rate as monetary costs”).
180. Robert P. Murphy, Working Group Broke the Rules with Its ‘Social Cost of Carbon’
Estimate, AMERICAN PRODUCTS, AMERICAN POWER (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.
productsandpower.org/2013/08/19/working-group-broke-the-rules-with-its-social-cost-of-carbonestimate/.
181. Luttrell, Differential Discounting, supra note 38.
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182

developing nations.
Since this furor has been largely focused on
EPA’s regulations of power plants under section 111 of the Clean Air
Act, this analysis will focus on those rules as well.
There are two principal objections to including foreign lives in
the SCC estimate. The first, and the most common objection, is that
agencies are required by government guidelines (meaning A-4) to
calculate a domestic estimate; the second is that EPA lacks the
authority to regulate for the benefit of foreign lives. Once these
objections are addressed, the basic question resolves to a simple
ethical one: in its assessments of the social value of regulatory
options, should the United States consider the global commons as a
free waste dump, except to the extent this dumping directly harms
Americans?
For the reasons described above, the first objection to reporting
global benefits in assessing climate change regulations is easily
refuted. A-4, a purely internal guideline to executive agencies that
was created ten years ago by executive fiat, does not bind the Obama
administration. If OMB allows the practice, then there is nothing that
prohibits agencies from including foreign benefits in the cost-benefit
analyses they prepare for OMB. Indeed, other federal agencies have
included foreign costs and benefits in regulatory CBAs when these
183
values were important and quantifiable. Moreover, agencies are not
required to exclude regulatory compliance costs borne by foreign
182. See Murphy, Power Plant Rule Fails Administration’s Own Cost/Benefit Test, supra note
23 (arguing that SCC estimates should focus on benefit to Americans rather than global benefit
from reduction in climate change); see also U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: INSTITUTE FOR 21
CENTURY, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF POTENTIAL NEW CARBON DIOXIDE REGULATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES 46–48 (2014) (discussing the impact of regulating CO2 emissions on
Americans, while neglecting to consider the impact CO2 emission regulations will have on
developing
nations),
available
at
http://www.energyxxi.org/sites/default/files/filetool/Assessing_the_Impact_of_ Potential_New_Carbon_Regulations_in_the_United_States.pdf;
The ‘Social Cost of Carbon: Some Surprising Facts: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Env’t and
Pub. Works, supra note 23, at 6–7 (discussing OMB guidance requiring the SCC to be estimated
from a domestic rather than a global perspective).
183. ENVTL. DEF. FUND ET AL., COMMENTS ON TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT:
TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
EXECUTIVE
ORDER
N O.
12,866
(Feb.
26,
2014),
available
at
UNDER
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/Joint-Comments-to-OMB.pdf (citing
Unique Device Identification System, 78 Fed. Reg. 58,786 (Sept. 24, 2013)); Standards for the
Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human Consumption, 78 Fed. Reg.
3504 (Jan. 16, 2013) (including costs to foreign farms); U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION REGULATORY AGENDA, RIN 1651-AA96 DEFINITION OF FORM I-94 TO
INCLUDE ELECTRONIC FORMAT (2013) (estimating preliminary net benefits to foreign travelers
and carriers).
ST
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184

companies doing business in the United States.
The second objection concerns agencies’ legal authority to
consider foreign lives when setting standards. In regards to EPA’s
use of the SCC in its CBA of the proposed regulation of existing
power plants, Professor Eric Posner argues that “96% of the global
population lives outside the United States. Obama lacks any clear
185
authority to regulate for their benefit.”
The relevant provisions in the Clean Air Act call on EPA to
regulate “air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
186
endanger public health or welfare.”
There is nothing in this
language or in the Clean Air Act that expressly limits EPA to
regulating exclusively on behalf of Americans. It would be perverse
if, although EPA has statutory authority to promulgate regulations
187
addressing “global warming,” it could not consider global benefits
in the CBAs of those regulations.
Even assuming, counterfactually, that EPA were required by
statute to set standards that ignore impacts on other countries, the
analyses it prepares for OMB review are not themselves establishing
regulatory standards under the applicable statutes. For example, the
question of what is the “best available control technology” for a
major stationary source of GHG pollution under section 111(b) of the
Clean Air Act need not be determined by the results of EPA’s CBA.
An influential article by Ted Gayer and Kip Viscusi argues that it
may be a bad idea to evaluate regulations from a global perspective
because, in the past, agencies generally have not done this, and we
should proceed with great circumspection before making substantial
188
changes from standard practice.
Ultimately, the goal of these
analyses is to estimate the welfare changes brought about by
regulation. Should we take the position that, moving forward, we will
184. See generally OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23 (stating that agencies are not
required to exclude regulatory compliance costs borne by foreign companies doing business in
the United States).
185. Eric Posner, Wrong Number: Obama’s New Climate Plan is Based on a Dubious
Calculation and Falls Woefully Short, SLATE (July 9, 2013), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/07/obama_s_climate_action_plan_how_it_m
iscalculates_the_social_cost_of_carbon.single.html.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012).
187. See generally Massachusetts v. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (stating that
the EPA can regulate greenhouse gases but cannot consider global benefits as part of its costbenefit analysis).
188. See generally GAYER & VISCUSI, supra note 19 (arguing that agencies should be careful
when evaluating regulations from a global perspective as it has not previously been the standard
practice).
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only care about American welfare because that has been our
tradition?
If this is our tradition, it is an illegitimate one. From a basic
moral standpoint, the United States should not make policy decisions
that rely on welfare analyses wherein most of the global harms the
United States causes to human welfare are automatically set to zero.
As a leading source of global GHG emissions, our energy policy is
paid for, in part, by the current and future residents of vulnerable
nations, like low-lying Bangladesh. These nations should not be
involuntarily conscripted to bear potentially catastrophic costs of the
United States’ domestic energy policy.
One option is to add a footnote to the welfare analysis,
explaining that the geographic areas considered in the calculation of
costs and benefits are not identical. This would be better than
requiring illegitimate welfare analyses that assume an entitlement to
treat other nations as free dumping grounds for our waste in the name
of producing cleaner analyses.
Another reason Mr. Gayer and Professor Viscusi argue against
EPA’s recent consideration of global benefits is that “if applied
broadly to all policies . . . [t]he global perspective would likely shift
189
immigration policy to one of entirely open borders[.]”
This is
simply irrelevant since there are numerous good government
190
practices that cannot be “applied broadly to all policies.” There is
no reason that EPA’s considering global welfare in analyses of
climate policy should have any effect on immigration policy.
D. Certain OMG Methodological Guidelines Not Followed Would
Have Increased the SCC
Opponents of President Obama’s Climate Action Plan focus on
the OMB rules that, quite appropriately, were not followed. That is,
the global scope of benefits and discount rate, as discussed in subpart
C, above. In contrast, little attention has been paid to common,
OMB-endorsed CBA methodologies that should have been followed.
These more correct methodologies would have increased SCC values.

189. Id. at 21.
190. Id.
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1. Lives in Developing Nations Are Valued Less than U.S. Lives
Within the Same Regulatory Analysis
OMB states that “current agency practice provides a value of a
statistical life (VSL) ranging from roughly $5 million to $9 million per
191
statistical life” for agency CBAs.
But the averted deaths in
developing nations—whose monetized values are imported into
agency CBAs via the SCC—are valued at a lower figure that is GDPdependent.
In both its 2010 and 2013 Reports on the Social Cost of Carbon,
the IWG relied on integrated assessment models (IAMs), which use
scientific, economic, and risk projections to generate estimates of the
192
monetized value of climate costs and benefits. In the IAMs relied
on by the IWG in estimating the SCC, harms to human health are
calculated as a percentage of GDP; the weight given to mortality and
health harms (such as deaths and diminished quality of life as a result
of illness) are thus significantly greater when the injured person lives
193
in a country with a higher GDP. Horribly, under this practice the
more climate change reduces a country’s GDP, the less its residents’
lives will be worth to save.
In domestic debates over how much carbon pollution the United
States should be externalizing, the only ethical answer to the question
of how foreign lives should be valued is that they should be given at
least as much weight as an American life. This is the only defensible
way to set a monetized value on the lives of people for whose deaths
or quality of life impairment the United States bears responsibility.
Human lives in developing countries, under certain CBA
assumptions, are worth much less than domestic lives because—due
principally to resource constraints—they are “willing to pay” (WTP)
194
less for incremental risk reductions. However, the challenge faced

191. OIRA: A PRIMER, supra note 36, at 10.
192. 2010 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SCC, supra note 147, at 5; 2013 TECHNICAL
UPDATE OF THE SCC, supra note 148, at 2.
193. See Ethan Case, The Value of Statistical Life and the Social Cost Of Carbon (Apr.
2013) (unpublished Masters thesis, Duke University), available at http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/
dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/6833/EthanCaseMP.pdf?sequence=1
(stating
that
this
assessment is “a number intended to price the damage done to the economy by each ton of
2
CO ”); see also 2010 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SCC, supra note 147, at 8–10
(explaining the method for monetizing the value of costs and benefits in integrated assessment
models).
194. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique, 2 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 195, 197–98 (2000) (arguing that lives in developing countries are worth less than
domestic lives under certain CBA assumptions as these individuals are willing to pay less for
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by the IWG is not to value WTP qua WTP; it is to create a monetized
social value for this good so it may be weighed against the social costs
of domestic regulation. The normative nature of this exercise is
195
unavoidable, since welfare economics is normative economics. The
2013 increases to the SCC are an improvement, since they mean the
US will consider climate change mitigation to be worth more in the
domestic regulatory context. But they are not enough. In the next
update to the SCC the IWG should consider the ways that the global
nature of the IAM inputs might create injustice when used without
upward adjustment in domestic RIAs that use higher values for
similar damages to Americans.
Thus, to be more just, IWG in its next report should adjust IAMs
so that foreign lives are valued at a level at least equal to the value of
domestic lives for the purposes of analyzing proposed domestic
196
actions. Given the nature of the IAM inputs, it may prove difficult
for the IWG to disaggregate the monetizations of health impacts so
that they may be valued equally to harms to Americans.
Nevertheless, to the extent this is possible for future SCC estimates, it
would improve what is presently a very unjust practice. In RIAs of
domestic regulations, the US should not persist in assigning the lives
of innocent people in developing nations, killed or harmed by U.S.
emissions, a lesser value than the lives of their American
counterparts.
2. The Baseline for the SCC
a. IWG’s Use of an IAM Model that Assumes Regulation Occurs
A-4 states: “You need to measure the benefits and costs of a rule
against a baseline. This baseline should be the best assessment of the
197
way the world would look absent the proposed action.”
This
directive, to use as a baseline the “status quo” world, is one that
would have been sensible for the IWG to adopt. While IWG is under
no obligation to use A-4 methodologies, this is another example of an
OMB methodology that would have been appropriate here, and one

certain risk reductions).
195. JUST ET AL., supra note 17, at 3.
196. If it is strongly desired as an analytical preference that the geographical area for which
costs are assessed equal the area for which benefits are assessed, then the area for which other
regulatory costs and benefits are assessed might be expanded to the whole world.
197. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 15.
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that would have raised the SCC if it had been followed.
To generate its “marginal” SCC values, the IWG needed to
198
make certain assumptions about future emissions. To facilitate this
process, a set of future scenarios was averaged that included both
business as usual (BAU) scenarios, and a scenario that assumed that
relatively rapid action would be taken to reduce or slow GHG
199
emissions rates.
For the suite of finalized and planned Obama administration
200
regulations that address climate change, any SCC values generated
using assumptions more optimistic than BAU for emissions are using
the wrong baseline. Unfortunately, the IWG’s SCC figures did
incorporate estimates that assumed concerted global action to reduce
201
emissions. When evaluating the costs and benefits of policies that
would reduce emissions from the BAU baseline, it is illogical to use a
model that assumes that any contemplated reductions from BAU will
occur. This is analogous to an attempt to assess the social value of
incapacitating an actually at-large assassin under the assumption that
she is already incapacitated—the monetized social value would be
zero, not because there is no real social gain from stopping her, but
because the calculus is based entirely upon an incorrect factual
assumption.
A more logical baseline from which to evaluate the current suite
of regulatory actions on climate—and any subsequent domestic
climate regulations and/or moves toward U.S. participation in
concerted global action on climate—is a BAU baseline. The IWG

198. The IWG also needed to make certain assumptions about future growth, in addition to
setting other dependent assumptions. To see this, consider attempting to assess the difference
in social value of a metric ton of drinking water under different assumptions about scarcity: its
value in the world where potable water is scarce would be very different from its value in a
world where it is bountiful.
199. 2010 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SCC, supra note 147, at 5.
200. See generally Cong. Research Service, Rep. No. R40506, Cars, Trucks, and Climate:
EPA Regulation Of Greenhouse Gases From Mobile Sources (2014), available at http://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R40506.pdf (describing the plan to issue a rule for new GHG emissions standards
for mobile sources); see also BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION OF
EXISTING POWER PLANTS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT: KEY THEMES EMERGING FROM THE
BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER’S WORKSHOP SERIES (2014), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/files/BPC%20Energy%20Greenhouse%20Gas%20Regulation(1).pdf
(discussing
GHG regulations); U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-14-669R, ENERGY
CONSERVATION PROGRAM: ENERGY CONSERVATION STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL ELECTRIC MOTORS (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664472.pdf
(explaining energy conservation standards for electric motors).
201. See 2013 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SCC, supra note 148, at 15 (explaining that
the U.S.’s working in tandem with other countries warranted a global measure of estimates).
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should not use a scenario that averages BAU scenarios with any
scenarios that simply assume some of the emissions goals of the
regulations will be achieved regardless of what course the regulator
takes.
One might argue that it is theoretically possible that concerted
global effort could actually move the world off its BAU pathway
without mitigation efforts from the United States. Realistically, given
the role of the United States in international diplomacy and its status
as a leading GHG emitter, such a scenario seems too unlikely to be
the basis of a substantial piece of a no-action baseline in the IWG
202
models. In short, the IWG most likely underestimates the SCC, as
applied to proposed climate mitigation measures, because it proposes
the wrong baseline for climate regulations.
3. The SCC May Underestimate the Compounding Effects of Major
U.S. Climate Change Regulations
A related issue that may cause agencies to underestimate climate
benefits, and one that the IWG might improve in its next set of
updates to the SCC, is that the IWG did not address how agencies
should assess emissions changes that are greater than “marginal.”
This static baseline is incompatible with the goal of U.S. climate
change regulations, which, it is hoped, will have significantly more
than a marginal impact on emissions. According to the IWG:
The purpose of the SCC estimates presented here is to make it
possible for agencies to incorporate the social benefits from
reducing carbon dioxide emissions into cost-benefit analyses of
regulatory actions that have small, or ‘marginal,’ impacts on
cumulative global emissions.203

IAMs generate economic values for additional incremental
emissions of carbon dioxide under various scenarios and assumptions.
These models—three of which are the foundation of the IWG’s SCC
values under both the original 2010 document and the 2013 technical
update—enabled the IWG to generate estimates of the monetized

202. See Fei Teng & Shuang-Qing Xu, Definition of Business as Usual and Its Impacts on
Assessment of Mitigation Efforts, 3 ADVANCES IN CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH 212, 213–17
(2012) (discussing mitigation efforts by developed and developing countries).
203. 2010 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SCC, supra note 147, at 2.
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204

social cost of one additional metric ton of carbon.
Assuming that the IWG’s valuations are correct for a single
metric ton, estimating the economic harm caused by emitting two
billion metric tons of carbon (or the harm avoided by preventing the
release of two billion metric tons of carbon) is far more complicated
than merely multiplying the SCC figure for a single metric ton by two
billion. This is because the change that would occur if the policy was
evaluated is not a marginal change in emissions. Changes of this
magnitude should alter assumptions in the model itself, and should
205
change the SCC figures the model produces.
Plugging a static set of SCC figures into partial equilibrium
analyses of a suite of regulations that would generate larger-thanmarginal changes in GHG output, violates the very basics of CBA
theory. In fact, the SCC should increase or decrease depending on
how stringent the suite of regulations addressing GHG emissions is.
This is the reason the IWG could only provide a value for marginal
changes in emissions to be used in domestic RIAs.
Given the enormous importance of U.S. mitigation efforts in
enabling successful diplomatic strategies to address climate change,
large mitigation may create opportunities to address climate change
that the United States would otherwise not have had. For this reason,
the estimated total value of the Obama administration’s collective
206
regulations to reduce carbon emissions is likely too low.
This discussion highlights a fundamental problem with CBA, one
that cannot be resolved by improving flawed methodologies—though
if CBA must be done, improving the CBA methodologies is
absolutely necessary and worth doing. The problem is this: real-world
207
regulatory CBAs are necessarily flawed and incomplete, but even
208
an idealized, textbook CBA
must rely on the existence of
209
equilibrium outside of the project or policy being assessed. OMBoverseen CBAs, which depend for their validity on the assumptions
necessary for “partial equilibrium analyses,” are simply not a good
204. Id.; see also 2013 TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SCC, supra note 148, at 2.
205. Kysar, supra note 22, at 60.
206. This argument has also been made by other commentators. E.g., id.; but see Posner,
supra note 185 (suggesting that EPA restrictions on carbon dioxide emissions by power plants
might send coal overseas for combustion).
207. E.g., Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 104.
208. For example, an analysis where changes in “consumer surplus” and “producer surplus”
effectuated by policy changes are fully estimated and compared over time.
209. See JUST ET AL., supra note 17, at 46 (explaining that partial equilibrium analysis must
focus on one factor at a time and assume that all other factors are unaffected).
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way to make regulatory decisions for major rules affecting public
health or the environment. CBA is especially unhelpful for decisions
affecting climate policy, where none of the key factors—including
many assumed to be constant or fixed in CBAs—are real-world
constants that can be assessed in isolation from each other or
assumed to remain stable. The CBA model is by definition
inapplicable.
While the 2013 updates to the IWG’s SCC numbers represent an
improvement over the lower 2010 figures, a switch to a less
formalized variety of regulatory analysis is required. This new
regulatory analysis must be less dependent on highly monetized CBA
in order to make the process rational and coherent.
VI. CONCLUSION
In issuing E.O. 12,866, President Clinton intended to relax the
210
Unfortunately,
Reagan-era focus on CBA in regulatory review.
standard setting continues instead to drift toward a de facto
“maximize monetized net benefits” decision criterion that is at odds
with many widely shared societal values, including those values
211
animating the very statutes whose regulations are being assessed.
U.S. public policy commitments—as embodied in the legislation
being implemented—should determine the way agencies evaluate
environmental and public health regulations. The reverse should not
be true. A small group of policy analysts’ ideological commitments to
certain methodologies should not be prompting agencies to make
choices that run counter to the protective environmental and public
health statutes these agencies are charged with carrying out.
Defects in A-4, combined with increased requirements that
agencies follow A-4’s controversial methodologies, result in
implementation of E.O. 12,866 in a way that gives inadequate
purchase to the deontological concerns expressly recognized as
deserving protection by the Order’s language. Despite its “gold
standard” reputation, A-4 is not a policy-neutral operationalization of

210. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (outlining the more holistic analysis
intended in E.O 12,866).
211. Shapiro, supra note 57, at 10435–36 (citing FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING,
PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004))
(supporting the proposition that “benefits, like environmental goods and the value of a life, are
inherently difficult to value, and, therefore, the benefits of regulations protecting these goods
are underestimated whereas costs are easily quantified and hence given a greater weight.”).
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E.O. 12,866. It was produced in a procedurally defective process, and
it is not the best way to do a welfare analysis, if one is to be done.
Conventional regulatory CBA is simply the wrong tool to assess
climate policy, and A-4’s continuing influence on analyses of climate
change regulations is increasingly dangerous.
Applying A-4’s
requirements even more strictly, as proposed by some policymakers,
could thwart urgently needed efforts to address an urgent and utterly
monumental threat.
The IWG’s recent increases to its estimated SCC are an
improvement. However, in order to make the regulatory review
process more rational and coherent, it is necessary to have a less
formalized variety of regulatory analysis. Regulatory analysis would
better inform regulatory decisions in the climate change arena if it
were less dependent on highly monetized CBA and instead put all
legitimate policy concerns (including the full panoply of
consequentialist and deontological concerns enumerated in E.O.
12,866 and the full range of concerns that animate the statutes being
implemented) on-screen in a coherent way. The primary goal of this
more rational analysis would be to enable what is known about the
full range of concerns to be evaluated and balanced by the agencies—
which are, after all, the bodies to which Congress actually delegated
the task of rulemaking—instead of by a defective algorithm.

